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L Introduction
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,' the
Supreme Court clarified that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 2 Since 1984,
however, high school student groups have not relied solely on their
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Foradiscussion,
see infra Part III.B.
2. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech.").
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constitutional free speech rights for protection. Instead, student groups have
been using the Federal Equal Access Act (EAA) 3 to protect their free speech
rights within the "schoolhouse gate." Modeled after the Supreme Court's
Widmar v. Vincent4 decision, the EAA mandates that schools receiving federal
funding and maintaining a limited open forum cannot discriminate against
student groups meeting within that limited open forum based on the content of
the group's speech.5 In passing the EAA, Congress was primarily motivated by
extending statutory protection to religious student clubs, which at the time were
experiencing discrimination at the hands of school officials.6 By the plain
language of the statute, however, free speech protection also extends to
"political, philosophical, or other content" of speech exercised by different
student clubs. 7 As a result, a new wave of litigation has emerged in which Gay
Straight Alliance (GSA) clubs are using the EAA for free speech protection. 8
As a consequence, schools that are petitioned by GSA clubs for
recognition face tough decisions. Due to the controversial nature of GSA
clubs, schools that choose to recognize such a club will have to deal with the
3. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 et seq. (2000).
4.

Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). For adiscussion of Widmar, see infra Part

II.A.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000). In its entirety, the section is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a
fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish.to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
Id.
6. See S. REP. No. 98-357, at 12 (1984) ("The priceless rights of freedom of speech and
free exercise of religion are being denied by our Nation's schools, the very institutions that
ought to teach their importance to the American way of life.").
7. See 130 CONG. REc. S 19,221 (1984) (statement by Sen. Leahy) ("Under the present
amendment, a limited open forum is available to young people to meet and discuss religious,
political, philosophical, and other ideas. That list of categories is not only content-neutral, but I
would be hard pressed to think of a topic that would not be covered.").
8. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 570 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (ruling on whether a school properly restricted a GSA club school access under the
EAA); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667,693
(E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining school from denying the formation
of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate the EAA); Colin v. Orange Unified
Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction
enjoining school from denying the formation of a GSA club because such-denial would most
likely violate the EAA); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d. 1166,
1180 (D. Utah 1999) (finding EAA granted GSA club the right to meet on school campus in
year 1997-98 because the school allowed a noncurriculum student club to meet during that
time).
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potentially hostile reaction the club will create among the student body and
surrounding community. 9 If a school chooses to deny recognition to a GSA
club, however, the school will have to circumvent the EAA. This is not easy.
The EAA protects student group access for student groups that fit within the
EAA's limited open forum.' ° A school is considered to have a limited open
forum if it allows a "noncurriculum-related" student group to meet on campus
during noninstructional time."
The courts have given the term
"noncurriculum-related" such a broad definition that it is very difficult for the
typical school to argue that it does not allow at least one noncurriculum-related
student group to meet on campus.' 2 Therefore, according to the majority of
courts that have applied the EAA to a GSA club, most schools will be subject
to the EAA and will have to13grant the typical GSA club equal access to the
school's limited open forum.
In this difficult situation, schools that are hostile to a GSA club would
have the same three choices faced by schools that are hostile to religious
groups. First, they could succumb to the EAA's mandate and grant the GSA
club access to its facilities. "4 Schools making this choice will have to treat the5
GSA club the same way they treat other noncurriculum-related clubs.'16
Second, they could deny the GSA club access and forego federal funding.
This is a very unpopular decision given the already stressed budgets of local
schools. 17 Finally, they could attempt to close their limited open forum by
9. See, e.g., Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (detailing a community's hostile picketing in
reaction to the proposed GSA club).
10. See infra Part II.B (recognizing that noncurriculum-related clubs are entitled to access
to a limited open forum).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (2000).
12. See infra Part H.B (noting the broad definition courts give "noncurriculum-related").
13. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93 (granting preliminary injunction enjoining
school from denying the formation of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate
the EAA); Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (granting preliminary injunction enjoining school from
denying the formation of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate the EAA);
East High Gay/StraightAlliance, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (finding EAA granted GSA club the
right to meet on school campus in year 1997-98 because the school allowed a noncurriculum
student club to meet during that time). But see Caudillo,311 F.Supp. 2d at 570 (finding that a
school was within the boundaries of the EAA's exclusions when the school denied a GSA club
access to its limited open forum).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000).
15. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting equal access
to mean all noncurriculum-related clubs are to be treated in the same manner).
16. See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd.of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that "school districts that do not wish to allow religious and other student groups equal access to
their facilities" must forego federal funding).
17. See id. (noting that foregoing federal funding is a burden on schools).
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8
refusing to allow noncurriculum-related student groups to meet on campus.1
However, the broad definition of "noncurriculum-related" makes this decision
also very unpopular because it means schools will have to deny access to clubs
that are very common among high schools.
What if a school was not totally hostile to the meeting of a GSA club but
wanted to exert more control over the club's access than is permissible under
the EAA? Is such a school still left with just these three choices? This Note
offers such schools a new choice. By making a GSA club curriculum-related, a
school can circumvent the equal access the Act offers a noncurriculum-related
student group. 19 This opportunity proves crucial for schools that do not want to
deny a GSA club access to its facilities totally, but instead want to limit their
access. In fact, Massachusetts is attempting to place such a restriction on GSA
clubs by requiring parental consent for any student wanting to join or form a
GSA club. 20 If a Massachusetts school maintains an EAA limited open forum,
the EAA would invalidate this parental consent restriction if the restriction was
applied to noncurriculum-related GSA clubs. 21 By making a GSA club
curriculum-related, however, a school will pull a GSA club out of the EAA's
limited open forum, and therefore, the school can exert control over that student
group's access that would otherwise be impermissible under the EAA. This
Note argues that a school willing to make a GSA club curriculum-related could
circumvent the EAA and thus salvage a parental consent restriction.
This approach may be the best option for schools faced with a tough
decision. On one hand, a school may have concerned parents that do not
want their children attending GSA club meetings without parent approval.22
Certainly, school boards must answer to these parents. On the other hand,
the school has to contend with the EAA and may not want to take the drastic

18. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County,
258 F. Supp. 2d 667,682-83 (2003) ("[w]hile a school has the right to maintain a closed forum
to maintain the dictates of the EAA, it does so at its own peril, running the risk that one or more
of its groups will be determined to be a 'noncurriculum-related group.'").
19. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that curriculum-related clubs do not get EAA protection).
20. An Act Relative to Parental Notification and Consent, H. 1445 (proposed 2003),
availableat http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht01445.htm (last visited Oct. 25,2004) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See infra Part HI.C.2 (arguing that the EAA invalidates a Massachusetts' parental
consent law as applied to noncurriculum-related GSA clubs).
22. See Parents' Rights Coalition, Fightfor the Strengthened Massachusetts Parents
Rights Bill!, availableat http://www.parentsrightscoalition.org/NewPRbill.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2004) (advocating for a parental consent restriction to be placed on GSA clubs) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).

1852

61 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1847 (2004)

measures that were traditionally considered the only choices available to
schools attempting to circumvent the EAA. Clearly, school boards facing this
situation have a dilemma. Foregoing federal funding and eliminating the
recognition of noncurriculum-related clubs are not popular decisions. As will
be argued in this Note, however, complying with the EAA would invalidate a
parental consent restriction and thus prevent a school from adequately serving
its students' parents. 23 By making a GSA club curriculum-related, a school can
grant recognition to a GSA club while also salvaging a parental consent law,
thus serving its parental contingency. This choice, unfortunately, also comes at
a price. Making a GSA club curriculum-related is not easy and will require a
school to adopt substantially the subject matter of a GSA club.24
In order to fully understand how this curriculum-related argument
functions, it is necessary to understand the background of the EAA and how the
Act operates. Therefore, Part H of this Note introduces the history of the EAA,
its major provisions, and the important case law interpreting the Act.
Specifically, this Note examines in detail how an EAA limited open forum is
created and thereby triggers EAA protection.25 Understanding how the courts
have defined "noncurriculum-related" under the EAA becomes crucial in
understanding how a school can avoid the EAA's limited open forum. In
addition, Part II will detail the case law interpreting what is meant by "equal
access" under the EAA.26 Finally, this Part will introduce the different statutory
restrictions the EAA places on student clubs' rights to meet. 27
Part 1I illustrates how the EAA protects a noncurriculum-related GSA
club. 28 Although the EAA was meant to protect religious student groups, Part
II nevertheless details how the legislative history, language, and background of
the EAA mandate free speech protection for GSA clubs. 29 Part III then focuses
on case law that applies the EAA to GSA clubs. 30 Although a split exists
among the federal district courts, this Note argues that the majority of
23. See infra Part III (arguing that the EAA invalidates Massachusetts' proposed parental
consent law).
24. See infra Part V.A (arguing that a school wanting to make a GSA club "curriculumrelated" will have to adopt the club's message).
25. See infra Part II.B (introducing the "limited open forum" concept).
26. See infra Part II.C (introducing case law interpreting "equal access").
27. See infra Part ll.D (introducing the different free speech restrictions codified in the

EAA).
28.
29.
30.
clubs).

See infra Part III (applying the EAA to a noncurriculum-related GSA club).
See infra Part III.A (justifying the extension of EAA protection to GSA groups).
See infra Part ILI.B-C (discussing how different courts have applied the EAA to GSA
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courts are correct when they grant GSA clubs EAA access. 3 1 Finally, to
illustrate how much protection the EAA offers noncurriculum-related GSA
clubs, Part III introduces Massachusetts' proposed law and shows how the
EAA would invalidate
such a law as applied to schools that maintain an EAA
32
limited open forum.
Part IV introduces the curriculum-related argument and argues that
curriculum-related student groups do not enjoy EAA protection. Two district
courts have suggested in dictum that curriculum-related student groups receive
EAA protection as long as a school allows one noncurriculum-related club to
meet on campus.33 This Part demonstrates that such an interpretation
misinterprets the language
of the EAA and also misconceives the notion of
34
forum.
open
limited
Finally, Part V revisits Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law and
shows how a school using a curriculum-related argument can salvage the
parental consent restriction. To do so, a school must make the GSA club
curriculum-related. This Part examines what it would take for a Massachusetts
school to make a GSA club curriculum-related.35 A school willing to make a
GSA club curriculum-related will be able to salvage Massachusetts' proposed
parental consent law. Finally, this 36Part briefly explores the different policy
issues surrounding such a decision.
II. EqualAccess Act
Understanding the purpose and operation of the EAA is crucial for
understanding this Note. The EAA's importance is also felt in student group
free speech cases because courts usually only apply the EAA and rarely reach
the First Amendment concerns. 37 Therefore, this Part details the history and
31. See infra Part Il.D (arguing that the majority of courts are correct in granting EAA
access to GSA clubs).
32. See infra Part I.E (applying the EAA to Massachusetts' proposed parental consent
law).
33. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the district courts' erroneous interpretation of the
EAA as applied to curriculum-related student groups).
34. See infra Part IV.B-C (arguing that the EAA does not extend to "curriculum-related"
student clubs).
35. See infra Part V.A (exploring what it would take to make a GSA club curriculumrelated).
36. See infra Part V.B (considering the policy justifications for salvaging Massachusetts'
proposed parental consent law).
37. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (resolving the conflict based
on the EAA and explicitly choosing not to rule on the First Amendment claims); Pope v. East
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purpose behind the EAA, introduces the critical concepts embodied within the
EAA, and introduces the case law interpreting these concepts. This Part
concludes with a summary of the overall themes one can glean from how the
courts apply the EAA's major provisions.
A. History of the EAA
In an attempt to thwart discrimination against religious student groups
while also balancing Establishment Clause interests, 38 Congress enacted the
Equal Access Act in 1984. 39 Congress modeled the EAA on the Supreme
Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1247 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the plaintiff filed
suit for violation of free speech and violation of the EAA and noting that the District Court
granted summary judgment on EAA grounds). But see Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 109092 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the First Amendment for free speech claims not covered by the
EAA); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1185 (D. Utah
1999) (rejecting defendant's claim that the First Amendment claims are preempted by the EAA).
38. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
39. 20 U.S.C. § 407 1(a) (2000). The Act, in its entirety, is as follows:
a)
Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political, philosophical,
or other speech content prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any public
secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a
limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that
limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or
other content of the speech at such meetings.
b)
"Limited open forum" defined. A public secondary school has a limited open
forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or
more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during
noninstructional time.
c)
Fair opportunity criteria. Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to
students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such
school uniformly provides that1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or
its agents or employees;
3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious
meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the
orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and
5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups.
d)
Construction of subchapter with respect to certain rights. Nothing in this
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Court's Widmar v. Vincent4° decision, which held that a state university could
not restrict a religious student group's access to a forum that is generally
opened to other student groups. 4' In Widmar, the University of Missouri
denied a registered religious group named Cornerstone access to its university
buildings on the grounds that a regulation adopted by the Board of Curators
prohibited the use of university buildings "for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching. '42 At the time, the university recognized over a hundred
student groups and provided these groups with access to its facilities for group
meetings and other activities.43 The Court found that the school had created an
open forum by allowing these other student groups to meet on campus."4 The
Court found the school engaged in an impermissible content-based exclusion in
denying religious student group access to this forum, thus violating the
students' free speech and association rights.45 Although the Court noted that

e)

f)

subchapter shall be construed to authorize the United States or any State or
political subdivision thereof1) to influence the form or content of any prayer or other religious activity;
2) to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious activity;
3) to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the space
for student-initiated meetings;
4) to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school meeting if the
content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs of the agent
or employee;
5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
6) to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a specified
numerical size; or
7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.
Federal financial assistance to schools unaffected. Notwithstanding the
availability of any other remedy under the Constitution or the laws of the
United States, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the
United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any school.
Authority of schools with respect to order, discipline, well-being, and
attendance concerns. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the
authority of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and
discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty,
and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary.

Id.
40. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
41. Id. at 277.
42. Id. at 265 (quoting the applicable regulation).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 267 ("Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University
has created a forum generally open for use by student groups.").
45. Id. at 277.
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respecting the Establishment Clause could act as a compelling state interest
justifying certain content-based discrimination, in this instance an "equal
access" policy allowing a religious student group to meet on a college campus
did not violate the Establishment Clause. 46
Because the Supreme Court in Widmar included language suggesting its
holding was restricted to universities and did not extend to secondary public
schools, 47 the federal courts remained split on the issue of religious student
group accommodation in the high school setting.4 8 In response to this split and
the subsequent confusion it caused among school administrators, Congress
enacted the EAA for the purpose of extending the Widmar speech protection to
high school students. 49
46. Id. at 273. In finding the Establishment Clause was not violated, the Court used the
oft-cited "Lemon test," announced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971). Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271. Under the Lemon test, government action will not
offend the Establishment Clause if the following three prongs are satisfied: "First, the
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ...; finally, the [policy] must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13).
In applying this test to the situation in Widmar, the Supreme Court held that an "open
forum" policy including nondiscrimination against religious speech would satisfy the Lemon
test. Id. at.271-72. An open forum's secular purpose of promoting idea exchange does not lose
its secular nature by merely allowing religious speech access. Id. at 271 n.10. The Court
emphasized that the forum was open not only for religious groups, but also for other groups. Id.
Second, a nondiscriminatory policy allowing religious groups access would not have a primary
effect of advancing religion because the forum is open to all for discourse, and an open forum
does not "confer an imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." Id. at 274.
Although the Court did recognize that a religious group would benefit from access to an open
forum, such a benefit was merely incidental and did not rise to the level of primary
advancement. Id. at 273. Finally, because the risk of entanglement would actually increase if
the school was permitted to prevent the religious group access to the forum, the third prong of
the Lemon test was satisfied, and the Court ruled a nondiscriminatory access policy to a limited
open forum did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 272 n. 11.
47. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14 ("[University students] are less impressionable than
younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of
neutrality toward religion.").
48. Compare Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1982) (denying a
religious student group the right to meet on school premises before the school day because to
allow the club to meet would violate the Establishment Clause) with Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 716 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that a public high school
created an open forum and therefore could not prevent a religious student club from meeting on
campus).
49. See 130 CONG. REc. S 19,212 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Federal legislation
can end this confusion by applying to federally assisted public secondary schools the principles
of constitutional law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Widmar case in 1981."); see also
130 CONG. REc. S 19,218 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dixon) ("Although the Supreme Court did
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Although the EAA was championed for mainly religious purposes, the
protection of the Act was extended to political and philosophical speech. 50 As
set forth in subsection (a), the EAA makes it unlawful for any public secondary
school receiving federal funding and "which has a limited open forum to deny
equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who
wish to conduct a meeting within [a] limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings." 5' If a school violates this provision, then it will either have to allow
the plaintiff to meet on campus, close its limited open forum, or forego federal
funding. 52 Therefore, it becomes crucial for schools to understand what is
meant by a "limited open forum" under the Act and whether that term is
interpreted liberally or narrowly by the courts. The following subpart will
examine in detail how "limited open forum" operates in the EAA context.
B. Limited Open Forum
Just as student group free speech protection in Widmar hinged upon
whether the university created a limited open forum, similar protection under
the EAA will exist only if the school provides a limited open forum for student
groups. However, unlike Widmar-which relied on established constitutional
principles in defining the school's forum-"limited open forum" in the EAA
context is statutorily defined by the Act.53 An EAA limited open forum is
not rule on the equal access issue as it relates to students in elementary or secondary schools, I
do not think there's anything wrong with giving our high school students the same right to equal
access in the schools as is permitted for university students.").
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000) (prohibiting federally funded schools with limited
open forums from discriminating against student groups "on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the [group's] speech").
51. Id.
52. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240-41 (1990) (explaining that schools
with limited open forums either have to close the forum, allow the plaintiff club to meet, or
forego federal funding).
53. The actual difference between the statutorily defined "limited open forum" in the EAA
and the "limited public forum" referred to in Widmar is very difficult to explain. See Douglas
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1, 36 (1986) (noting that comparison between EAA's
"limited open forum" and the constitutional concept of "limited public forum" could be
misleading). The Supreme Court in Mergens does recognize that the EAA does not incorporate
the Widmar definition of "limited public forum":
Congress was presumably aware that "limited public forum," as used by the Court,
is a term of art... and had it intended to import that concept into the Act, one
would suppose that it would have done so explicitly. Indeed, Congress' deliberate
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created at a public secondary school "whenever such school grants an offering
to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum-related student groups to meet
on school premises during noninstructional time. '"54
Clearly, "noncurriculum" and "noninstructional" are key concepts in the
definition of "limited open forum." The definition of those terms will
determine whether a school will fall under the purview of the EAA.55 The
EAA defines noninstructional time as "time set aside by the school before
actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction
ends."56 The definition of noncurriculum is especially important for purposes
of this Note because how that term is defined will dictate what a school has to
do to make a student group curriculum-related. If a student group is
curriculum-related, then the group will not fall within the EAA's limited open
forum and will not enjoy EAA protection.
Unfortunately, Congress chose not to define "noncurriculum," leaving the
meaning of "limited open forum" vague until the Supreme Court interpreted
the Act in Mergens v. Board of Education. In Mergens, a student at
choice to use a different term-and to define that term-can only mean that it
intended to establish a standard different from the one established by our free
speech cases.
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 242.

54.

20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (2000).

55. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 237 (noting that "noncurriculum-related" is a key phrase and
that "noninstructional" means before or after classes).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4) (2000). Despite this definition, a circuit split has developed
regarding the definition of "actual classroom instruction." Compare Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d
1074, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining "actual classroom instruction" as any time when a school
mandates attendance, regardless of whether the teacher is holding formal instruction) with
Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with
the Ninth Circuit and holding that "actual classroom instruction" is defined as when formal
instruction is being held).
57. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 237-38 (interpreting for the first time the meaning of
"noncurriculum related student group").
A plurality of the Supreme Court found that the EAA did not violate the Establishment
Clause and therefore was constitutional. Id. at 248. In Mergens, the school district argued that
because school recognition of student activities was an integral part of its educational mission,
official recognition of a religious club would represent an impermissible endorsement of
religion by the school. Id. at 247-48. The school further noted that unlike the college setting in
Widmar, a state's compulsory attendance laws for public secondary schools creates an
impermissible risk that the objective high schooler will perceive official school recognition ofa
religious student group as official school support for such religious meetings. Id. at 249.
In rejecting these arguments, the Mergens plurality noted that the Widmar court found that
an "equal access" policy at the university level did not violate the Establishment Clause and that
the "logic of Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act." Id. at 248.
Furthermore, the plurality recognized that although the legislators might have had religious
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Westside High School, Bridget Mergens, requested the principal's permission
to form a Christian club at the school.58 At this time, Westside permitted
students to join various student groups-including a chess club-that all met
after school on school premises. 59 The principal and other school officials
denied Mergen's request to form the Christian club because school policy
required all clubs to have a faculty sponsor, which a religious club could not
have because of the Establishment Clause. Also, the school stated that the mere
existence of the club at the school would violate the Establishment Clause.6°
Mergens brought suit alleging that the school's refusal to recognize her
religious club violated the EAA. 6 1 The district court found for the school, and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the school did create
a limited open forum under the Act and that the Act itself did not violate the
Establishment Clause.62
In affirming the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court found that the EAA' s
passage and legislative history reflected a broad legislative purpose, which
supported an interpretation of "noncurriculum related student group" to mean
broadly "any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses
offered by the school. ,63 According to the Court:
[Al student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the subject
matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly
offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of
courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular
64
course; or if participation in the group results in academic credit.

motives in promulgating the Act by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of political,
philosophical, and other speech, as well as religious speech, the Act evinced a secular purpose
and thus satisfies the secular prong of the Establishment Clause analysis. Id. The plurality also
found that secondary school students were "mature enough and are likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis." Id. at 250. Therefore, the plurality found that by extending the same free speech
protection given to University students in Widmar to high school students, the EAA did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 253.
58.

Id. at 232.

59. See id. at 231 ("Students ... are permitted to join various student groups and clubs, all
of which meet after school hours on school premises.").
60. Idat 232-33.
61. Id. at 233.
62. Id. at 233-34.
63. See id. ("We think it significant, however, that the Act, which was passed by wide,
bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, reflects at least some consensus on a
broad legislative purpose.").
64. Id. at 239-40.
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A French club would fit within the first category if the school offered a
French class. 65 A student government would fit within the second category
because it formulates proposals and is generally proactive with respect to the
body of courses as a whole. 66 A student group would satisfy the last two
categories if participation in the group was required by a class or if academic
credit was offered.67 The Court further noted that a tangential relationship to
abstract educational goals of the school will not satisfy the definition of
"curriculum related" under the EAA because to hold otherwise would make it
too easy for schools to get around the EAA. 68 In determining whether a school
has created a limited open forum, a trial court must look beyond the school's
stated policy and apply the above definition to the school's actual practice,
keeping in mind the broad legislative purpose embodied in the EAA.69
When turning to the facts in Mergens, the Court rejected the school
board's argument that it did not have a limited open forum. 70 In doing so, the
Court focused on several clubs, including the school's chess club. 71 The school
tried to argue that its chess club was a curriculum-based student group because
it encouraged critical thinking skills used in classes such as math and science.72
The Supreme Court reasoned that even though some math teachers did
encourage their students to play chess, chess was not taught as a regular course
and a student did not receive extra credit as a result of playing chess.73
Therefore, the chess club fit within the definition of "noncurriculum related
student group" under the EAA. 74 Because this club, and several others, were
considered noncurriculum, the Court determined that the school had created a
limited open forum; thus, the school fell within the purview of the EAA.75
65. Id. at 240.
66. See id. ("A school's student government would generally relate directly to the
curriculum to the extent that it addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals
pertaining to the body of courses offered by the school.").
67. See id. ("If participation in a school's band or orchestra were required for the band or
orchestra classes, or resulted in academic credit, then those groups would also directly relate to
the curriculum.").
68. See id. at 244 (noting that defining "curriculum related" as meaning something
remotely related to abstract educational goals would make the act merely "hortatory").
69. Id. at 246 ("[Our definition of 'noncurriculum related student activities' looks to a
school's actual practice rather than its stated policy.").
70. id.
71. Id. at 245-46.
72. Id. at 244.
73. Id. at 245.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 246 (explaining the ways that various clubs at the school were
"noncurriculum related student groups" and thus "finding that [the school] has maintained a
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The Supreme Court's analysis of noncurriculum-related activities offers a
few key themes that schools need to be aware of when determining whether a
school has created a limited open forum under the EAA. First, because the Court
recognized that the EAA received bipartisan support, suggesting a broad
legislative intent, a court will apply Mergen's curriculum-related test broadly.76
As the Supreme Court stated, clubs will not be considered curriculum based if
they only have a tangential relationship with the school's curriculum. 77 Indeed, a
very close nexus between the student club and the curriculum is necessary for a
school to argue successfully that a particular club is curriculum-related. Second, a
court need only find one noncurriculum-related club in order to conclude that a
school has created a limited open forum. 78 And finally, courts will look at the
school's actual practices, not just its policy, when determining whether the school
has created a limited open forum. 79 These themes are important to recognize
because they will influence a school's decision on whether it is acceptable to
create a close nexus between the school's curriculum and a GSA club's subject
matter.
These themes are well exemplified in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's
decision in Pope v. East Brunswick Board of Education.80 There, the school
board characterized its extracurricular activities as an integral part of its
curriculum so that it would avoid the EAA. 8 1 After Mergens, the school board
changed its policy to reflect that decision and thus required every
extracurricular activity to be sponsored by the board with an appointed
faculty member leading the organization.8 2 The policy further attempted to emulate

limited open forum under the Act").
76. See id. at 239 ("In light of this legislative purpose, we think that the term
'noncurriculum related student group' is best interpreted broadly to mean any student group that
does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school.").
77. See id. at 238 ("The logic of the Act also supports this view, namely, that a
curriculum-related student group is one that has more than just a tangential or attenuated
relationship to courses offered by the school.").
78. See 20 U.S.C § 4071(b) (2000) (explaining that a limited open forum is created
whenever a school allows one or more noncurriculum-related groups to meet).
79. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,246 (1990) (recognizing that the Court's
definition of "noncurriculum related activities" looks to a school's actual practice rather than its
stated policy).
80. Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 1246.
82. Id. at 1246-47.
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all of the
the Mergens definition of "curriculum related" by categorizing
83
school's clubs as directly related to the school curriculum.
Although several clubs disbanded due to the new policy, the Key club-a
student service organization dedicated to assisting and enhancing a student's
development of civic responsibility to the community-survived. The school
argued that because students taking the high school's history and humanities
class were required to participate in some of the events run by the club, this
participation provided a sufficient nexus between the club and the school's
curriculum to survive the Mergens test.85 In rejecting this characterization, the
Court reasoned that mere student participation in club activities is not sufficient
to survive the Mergens test.86 Rather, required membership would be necessary
to show a sufficient nexus between the group and the school curriculum.8 7 In
making this distinction, the Third Circuit stated that "the curriculum-relatedness
of a student activity must be determined by reference to the primary focus of
the activity measured against the
significant topics taught in the course that
8
assertedly relates to the group.t
Although the Mergens Court did give a somewhat bright line rule
regarding the definition of noncurriculum, application of this rule is extremely
difficult. Scholars have grappled with making sense of this definition and have
explored its importance.8 9 It is imperative to recognize that the definition of
"noncurriculum" has been given a very broad import by the Mergens Court and
its progeny. 9° In fact, the Mergens Court's definition of noncurriculum
83. See id. at 1247 (quoting the school district's policy). The policy states:
All co-curricular clubs and activities to be approved for Board sponsorship shall be
directly related either to specific subject matter which is the subject of one or more
courses offered in the school district, concern the body of courses offered as a
whole, or provide experiences which are deemed by the school district to enhance
understanding of a course or courses offered within the district curriculum.
Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1252.
86. Id.
87. See id. (observing that Mergens focused on participation in the group and not
participation in the group's activities).
88. Id. at 1253.
89. See Laycock, supra note 53, at 35-38 (detailing the difficulty in determining when a
limited open forum may exist at a school); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Equal Access Act and
Public Schools: What are the Legal Issues Related to Recognizing Gay Student Groups?,2001
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 29 (noting the difficulty in predicting how different federal courts
would apply the Mergens test in analogous situations).
90. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (noting that under the Mergens test, a group is noncurriculum-related
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arguably expands the concept of "limited open forum" from the Court's
constitutional definition of limited open or public forum used in Widmar and
other similar free speech cases. 91 As a result, the EAA is interpreted as
92
transferring significant discretion away from school boards to federal judges.
By offering a mechanically applied bright line test, combined with an imputed
broad legislative intent, the Supreme Court's "noncurriculum" formulation
functions to restrict severely the school board's autonomy to structure its
extracurricular activity in a way commensurate with a pedagogical strategy.9 3
Once a school allows a noncurriculum-related student group to meet on
campus, thus creating a limited open forum, that school must grant other
noncurriculum clubs "equal access" to that limited open forum. 94 The next
subpart explores the meaning of "equal access" under the EAA.
C. Equal Access
The Act also did not define "equal access," and only a few federal courts
have interpreted the term. 95 The interpretation of this term will dictate how a
school must treat student groups that are entitled to access to the school's
limited open forum. This point becomes especially important when analyzing

even if there is overlap between what the group discusses and what is taught in the school's
curriculum); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the Mergens definition and how it has been
applied by the Third Circuit).
91. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 276 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the Court's articulation of noncurriculum and rather advocating that "limited open
forum" should be defined in a manner consistent with the forum that existed in Widmar); see
also Laycock, supra note 53, at 36 (arguing that the statutory limited open forum goes well
beyond the Supreme Court's limited public forum concept).
92. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 259 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It must be apparent to all
that the Act has made a matter once left to the discretion of local school officials the subject of
comprehensive regulation by federal law."). But see Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311
F. Supp. 2d 550, 570 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (upholding the school's decision to prevent a GSA club
EAA access to school facilities).
93. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 276 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (suggesting that a limited open
forum exists when a school allows a partisan group to meet on campus, so that a school can
retain some level of pedagogical power over the make up of its extracurricular activities).
94. See id. at 247 (suggesting noncurriculum-related clubs are to be treated equally at a
school that maintains an EAA limited open forum).
95. See id. at 247 (interpreting briefly the meaning of equal access); Prince v. Jacoby, 303
F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting equal access); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch.
Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 859-62 (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting the meaning of equal access).
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the applicability of Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law to a
noncurriculum-related GSA club.9 6
The Mergens Court briefly considered the meaning of "equal access,"
finding that under the EAA, Westside High School had to give Mergen's
religious student club the same official recognition it gave other noncurriculum
clubs.9 7 The federal appellate courts have engaged in a more focused inquiry
into the meaning of "equal access" under the EAA. Consistent with the
Supreme Court's finding of an overall broad legislative purpose, these courts
have given the term "equal access" a very broad import.98 For instance, in
Princev. Jacoby,99 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that once a
school has offered a limited open forum to student groups, "religiously-oriented
student activities must be allowed under the same terms and conditions as other
extracurricular activities. "1o In Prince,an eleventh grade student at Spanaway
Lake High School petitioned the school district to grant her Christian Bible
club-the "World Changers"-formal recognition as an "Associated Student
Body" (ASB) club.10 ' The school district denied Prince her request, offering to
grant the club recognition only as a "Policy 5525" club.' 0 2 The school district
enacted Policy 5525 in order to comply with the EAA, specifically modeling
the policy after Section 4071(c) of the EAA, the "fair opportunity" criteria
section. 1 3 Prince complained that Policy 5525 clubs were not entitled to the
same benefits as ASB clubs. These benefits included: (1) access to ASB
money to fund club activities, (2) free participation in ASB fundraising events,
(3) school yearbook appearance free of charge, (4) permission to meet during
student/staff time during school hours, (5) greater access to facilities for
publicity purposes, and (6) use of audio-visual equipment and school
vehicles. 104

96. See infra Part HI.C (applying the EAA to Massachusetts' proposed parental consent
law).
97. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247.
98. See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 862 ("By concluding that the School's non-recognition denies the
Hsus 'equal access,' we are giving the term 'equal access' the broad construction that the
Supreme Court requires.").
99. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. Id. at 1081 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-71(1981)).
101. Id. at 1077.
102. Id.
103. Id. For a detailed discussion of the "fair opportunity" section, see infra notes 110-22
and accompanying text.
104. Prince,303 F.3d at 1078.
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Although Congress did not define "equal access," the Ninth Circuit
noted that the EAA was mirrored after Widmar.105 Therefore, "equal access"
under the EAA means what the Supreme Court said in Widmar, namely that
religious student groups are to be treated in the same manner schools treat
other student groups in a limited open forum setting. 106 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit found that the EAA required the school district to extend to Policy
5525 clubs any benefit the school district offered to ASB clubs, as long as in
doing so other sections of the EAA were not violated. 1°7
Prince suggests that noncurriculum student clubs under the EAA cannot
be treated differently based on the content of their speech. However, this
does not mean that a school policy uniformly applied to all student groups
will necessarily be sufficient to satisfy "equal access" under the statute. In
Hsu v. Roslyn,10 8 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a school's
nondiscriminatory policy was not applicable to a religious student group's
exclusionary leadership rule under the EAA because the school's
nondiscriminatory policy prevented the group from structuring its leadership
in a manner consistent with the group's characteristic.' °9 In that case, the
school district adopted a policy where students could not be excluded from
participating in extracurricular activities because of their religious beliefs. "
The religious group "Walking on Water" wanted to institute a policy whereby
students who did not believe in Jesus could not be leaders in the club, but the
school barred the group from having such a restriction.'
Although the
school uniformly applied its policy to all clubs, the court said that under the
EAA the school had to exempt the Walking on Water club from such a policy
because the policy barred the club from protecting its character. 2 The court
reasoned that the group's leadership exclusion was no different than a chess
club requiring members to know something about chess." 3 As a
Christian group, Walking on Water should be able to structure its
leadership in such a way that it could ensure its agenda will be advanced

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
therefore

Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1084.
Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 862.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 862.
See id. at 860 ("The club's leadership eligibility requirement on the basis of religion is
similar to a chess club's eligibility requirement based on chess.").
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at its meetings. 114 Thus, the club should115have the same latitude in
structuring its leadership as other clubs enjoy.
Courts interpreting the term "equal access" continue the theme of
supporting the free speech rights of students. The EAA's broad legislative
purpose dictates so much deference to the free speech rights of the students
that even a nondiscriminatory policy will be invalidated if it unduly hinders
those rights.' 6 On the other hand, the EAA does place certain restrictions on
the free speech rights it extends to students. As succinctly stated by the Hsu
court, the Act's equal access mandate "can be trumped by the School's
responsibility for upholding the Constitution, for protecting the rights of
other students, and for maintaining 'appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school.'"117 The following subpart examines these restrictions in more
detail.
D. EAA Restrictionson Student Speech
Although the EAA offers student groups broad protection, the Act does
place certain restrictions on that protection. Most of these restrictions stem
from Congress's concern that Establishment Clause challenges would prevent
student groups from receiving the Act's protection.' 18 Defendant schools in
GSA club litigation, however, have picked up on these restrictions and have
argued that these restrictions permit a school to deny GSA clubs access to the
school's limited open forum. 119 It is important to be aware of these
restrictions; therefore, the following sections describe them in more detail.

114. See id. ("[A]n officer's commitment to the group's cause allow[s] the group to ensure
that its agenda will be advanced at its meetings.").
115. See id. at 860 ("[E]xemptions from neutrally applicable rules that impede one

or another club from expressing the beliefs that it was formed to express, may be required if a
school is to provide 'equal access."').
116. See id. (same).
117. Id. at 862 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,509

(1969)).
118.

See Laycock, supra note 53, at 42-43 (noting that three of the five fair opportunity

criteria set forth in § 4071(c) were placed in the EAA in response to Establishment Clause
concerns).
119. See infra Part III.B (introducing the defendant's argument that subsection (c)(4)
permits schools to deny GSA clubs EAA protection).

SCHOOLS TRYING TO A VOID EQUAL ACCESS ACT

1867

1. FairOpportunity Criteria
In addition to providing equal access, the EAA also requires a school to
give a student group a "fair opportunity" to meet on campus. 120 Subsection (c)
of the EAA defines the meaning of fair opportunity by offering five different
criteria. 2 1 An admittedly confusing part of the EAA's statutory scheme, this
subsection was included in the Act primarily so that schools complying with the
EAA could also comply with the Establishment Clause. 22 The first three
criteria speak to this concern and require that: (1) a school uniformly provide
that student meetings are voluntary and student-initiated, (2) school officials
have not sponsored the meetings, and (3) school officials are present at
religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity. 23 The fourth
criterion allows a school to forbid the meeting of groups that would
"materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of
educational activities within the school," and the fifth criterion requires
schools to prohibit nonschool personnel from directing, controlling, or
regularly attending activities of the group. 24 According to the EAA,
schools that meet these five criteria have offered student groups a "fair
opportunity" to meet on campus.
As pointed out by Professor Douglas Laycock, the first three criteria
are specifically designed to apply to religious student clubs who also have
to respect Establishment Clause restrictions, while the final two criteria
protect "legitimate interests of the school."', 25 Although this Note will not
120. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000).
121. See id. (setting forth the five criteria).
122. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) ("This provision
[subsection (c)] was included to avoid excess entanglement with religion, so that the Act would
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge.").
123. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1)-(3) (2000).
124. Id.
125. Laycock, supra note 53, at 42-43. The EAA's "fair opportunity criteria" subsection isa
very confusing piece of the EAA's statutory scheme. Indeed, Professor Laycock characterizes this
subsection as suffering from a statutory glitch. Id. at 43. He notes that although three of the criteria
were specifically added to address Establishment Clause concerns as they related to religious
student groups, the subsection's language suggests that the criteria are meant to apply to all student
groups seeking recognition under the Act. Id. Professor Laycock finds it even more troubling that
subsection (c)'s introductory clause says a fair opportunity to meet has been offered if the school
"uniformly provides" for these five criteria. Id. He notes that this language, if read literally, would
mean a school would have to uniformly apply all of these criteria to its noncurriculum student
groups if it would satisfy the Act, even though three of these criteria are only meant to apply to
religious student groups. Id. Exploring the effect of this so called "statutory glitch" is outside the
purview of this Note. This subsection's importance as it relates to the thesis of this Note stems
from the Tinker restriction and, to a lesser extent, subsection (c)(5).
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focus on the first three sections, it is important to note that sponsorship-as
it is used in subsection (c)(2)-means "promoting, leading, or participating
in a meeting."' 26 By limiting the meaning of sponsorship to meetings, the
EAA offers schools the ability to oversee their extracurricular clubs without
being deemed to have sponsored the groups' meetings. 27 Furthermore,
when a school refuses to offer groups the opportunity to use bulletin boards
for advertising, newspapers, et cetera, the school cannot claim that to do so
would mean it is sponsoring the group. 28 Rather, offering such an
29
opportunity means the school is recognizing the group, not sponsoring it.
Most courts read the fourth criterion, as found in subsection (c)(4), as
simply codifying the Supreme Court's holding in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District. 30 This holding is premised on the
126.

20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (2000).

127. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling that state
regulations requiring student groups to "be formed with the approval, and operated subject to
the control, of the board of directors of a school district" did not amount to sponsorship because
(1) the regulations did not require the board to be involved in the specific meetings of the group,
and (2) the board's approval was directed to group budgets as a whole and did not require the
board to approve any specific group's constitution or by-law) (quoting Wash. Admin. Code
§ 392-138-010(1) (1999)).
128. See id. at 1086-87 (noting that the EAA requires a school to offer a religious club
access to bulletin boards, newspapers, and public address systems).
129. See Susan Broberg, Note, Gay/StraightAlliances and Other ControversialStudent
Groups: A New Test for the EqualAccess Act, 1999 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 87,94 (distinguishing
sponsorship from recognition by noting sponsorship under the EAA "implies that the schools
themselves are endorsing or promoting the purposes and speech of the organization" whereas
recognition means simply the group may enjoy "access to school bulletins, newspapers,
announcements, club fairs, participation in activities of the school and so forth").
130. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In a 7-2
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a student's free speech rights cannot be abridged unless
the student's conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). In December 1965, two high school students and one junior
high student decided to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. Id. at
504. The plan was to wear the armbands from December 16 to New Year's Eve. Id. When
principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the armband plan, they adopted a policy
on December 14, 1965, stating that "any student wearing an armband to school would be asked
to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband."
Id. The students disobeyed the policy, were suspended from school, and did not return until
after New Year's Day. Id. The students and their parents sued to enjoin school officials from
disciplining the students. Id. The district court ruled in favor of the school, declaring that the
school's policy was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id. at 505.
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court first characterized the students' conduct
as pure speech, which is entitled to broad protection under the First Amendment. Id. at 508.
From that premise, the Court made its popular assertion that "[i]t
can hardly be argued that
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notion that students do not give up their constitutional free speech rights
when they go to school. '31 Rather, schools cannot regulate personal student
speech unless it materially "disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.' ' 32 Although this language is
difficult to define precisely, it is important because defendant schools have
been using it as justification for preventing GSA clubs' access to their

either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. However, the Court did note that within the public school
context, the free speech rights of students needed to be reconciled with school officials'
legitimate interest in maintaining discipline and furthering the educational process. Id. at 507.
In viewing the record, the Court noted that the students' conduct did not cause any disorder or
disturbance and was instead a "silent, passive expression of opinion." Id. at 508. In powerful
and poignant language, the Supreme Court rejected a school board's fear that such speech
would cause a disturbance as a basis for suppressing the students' free speech rights. In
particular, the Court made the following remarks:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute
regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may
inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take the risk... and our history
says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom--this kind of openness-that is the
basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
Id. at 508-09.
The Court further commented that school officials do not have absolute authority over their
students, students have fundamental rights that the State must respect, and "students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate." Id.
at 511. Instead, the classroom is considered a marketplace of ideas, and personal
intercommunication among students is one of several activities to which schools are dedicated.
Id. at 512. Therefore, unless a student's expression of his or her opinion would materially and
substantially interfere with schoolwork or discipline, school officials cannot limit such speech.
Id. at 514.
Courts find this holding to be embodied in subsection (c)(4). See Hsu v. Roslyn Union
Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 870 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that subsection (c)(4) embodies
the Tinker holding); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd.of Educ., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 682 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (viewing subsection (c)(4) as a codification of the Tinker
holding); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(viewing subsection (c)(4) as a codification of the Tinker holding). But see Caudillo v. Lubbock
Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 569 (N.D. Tex. 2004) ("Although § 407 1(c) somewhat
tracks the Tinker language, this court does not believe that the EAA requires such a substantial
showing of interference under other exceptions.").
131. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
132. Id. at 513.

1870

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1847 (2004)

limited open forums. 133 How these arguments operate and why they fail is
the focus of Part III.134
Subsection (c)(5) restricts nonschool personnel from directing,35
conducting, controlling, or regularly attending student group activities.
Although this prohibits nonschool persons from regularly attending student
group meetings, 136 this restriction does not necessarily mean that student
to receive some kind of support or contact from
groups are not allowed
137
persons.
nonschool
2. PreservedRights and Power Retained by Schools
Subsection (d)(5) prevents the EAA from being used to "sanction
meetings that are otherwise unlawful,"' 38 and subsection (d)(7) prevents the
EAA from abridging the constitutional rights of any person. 139 Subsection (f)
states that the Act is not meant to limit the authority of the "school to maintain
order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-being of students
and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is
voluntary."' 4 Although this subsection sounds as though it repeats the fair
opportunity criteria, at least one court and one scholar have suggested that this
way to combat student speech that is not
subsection can offer schools a distinct
141
available under subsection (c).

133. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91 (rejecting the school's Tinker argument).
134. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the EAA protects GSA clubs).
135. U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5) (2000).
136. See Sease v. Sch. Dist., 811 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that a school
gospel choir violates the EAA by hiring and allowing a nonschool person to participate).
137. See Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135,1146 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(finding that it was acceptable under the EAA for a Gay Straight Alliance club to receive limited
moral support from a nonschool volunteer group).
138. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(5) (2000).
139. Id. § 407 1(d)(7).
140. Id.§ 4071(f).
141. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 571 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (holding that subsection (f), also known as the "well-being exception," properly allowed a
school to deny a GSA club EAA access); Matthew Hilton, Optionsfor Local School Districts
Reviewing Local Governance and Moral Issues Raised by the Equal Access Act: The GayStraight Student Alliance in Utah, 1996 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 28 (arguing that the well-being
permits schools to restrict club access based on a moral foundation).
part of subsection (f)
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E. Summary of EAA and EAA Case Law
Courts apply the EAA in a way that grants students a broad free speech
protection at the expense of school official authority. With courts giving the
term "noncurriculum" a broad import, schools have difficulty controlling which
clubs will have access to their facilities. 142 It only takes one noncurriculumrelated club meeting on campus for a court to decide that a school has created a
limited open forum. 143 The concept of "equal access" also enjoys a broad
legislative import that mandates a school to treat all student groups in the EAA
limited open forum in a similar manner. 144 The deference to students is so
strong that even a nondiscriminatory policy
will yield to the student club if that
145
policy unduly hinders student rights.
On the other hand, the EAA does impose restrictions on the free speech
rights it gives students. Although most of these restrictions exist out of concern
for the Establishment Clause, there are other restrictions that exist, most notably
the Tinker standard and subsection (f).146 These restrictions are by no means
the only non-Establishment Clause related restrictions, but they are arguably the
most popular, at least in the GSA club context. 147
Before continuing, it is important to note how the typical court analysis
under the EAA proceeds. For all student groups that sue for EAA protection,
courts will start their EAA analysis by applying the Mergens curriculum-related
test to determine whether a school has allowed a noncurriculum-related student
group to meet on campus.148 If at least one noncurriculum-related club has
been found to meet during noninstructional time, then a court will rule that the
49
school has created a limited open forum and will apply the EAA.115 °
Furthermore, courts will employ a broad interpretation of "equal access.
142. See supra Part I.B (noting how the EAA limits school official discretion when
regulating student group speech).
143. See supra Part II.B (discussing the meaning of noncurriculum-related).
144. See supra Part II.C (discussing the meaning of equal access).
145. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 873 (2d Cir. 1996)
(immunizing a student group from a nondiscriminatory policy that violated the student groups'
free speech rights).
146. See supra Part I.D. 1 (discussing the fair opportunity criteria section).
147. See infraPart IH.B (discussing the Tinker argument as applied to GSA clubs seeking
EAA protection).
148. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Mergens curriculum-related test).
149. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990) (noting that a school is
deemed to have created a limited open forum if one or more noncurriculum-related groups are
permitted to meet before or after class).
150. See supra Part II.C (noting the broad definition courts give the term "equal access").
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And, depending on the circumstances of the case, courts will determine
whether a school can validly restrict the student group's access based on the
restrictions codified in the EAA. 15 1 The next Part focuses on how such an
analysis operates when EAA protection is extended to GSA clubs.
III. Extending EAA Protectionto Gay StraightAlliance Groups
Until recently, most of the litigation involving the EAA has focused on
speech protection for religious groups.1 52 In that context, courts dealt with
issues regarding whether a limited open forum was created, 5 3 the interpretation
of "equal access," 154 and whether extending EAA protection to religious clubs
would violate the Establishment Clause. 55 With a new wave of litigation
involving EAA protection to GSA clubs, 56 defendant schools have
offered new arguments in challenging the EAA. Given the controversial
nature of GSA clubs, some schools have argued that allowing such clubs to
151. Compare Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135,1146-47 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (addressing argument that GSA club is run by nonschool personnel in violation of
subsection (c)(5) of the EAA) with Sease v. Sch. Dist., 811 F. Supp. 183, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(finding that a school gospel choir violates the EAA by hiring and allowing a nonschool person
to be involved with the group).
152. See supra Part II.A (discussing cases applying the EAA to religious clubs). Although
most litigation did involve religious groups, at least one case prior to 1999 discussed EAA
protection of a secular group. See Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 776
F.2d 431, 438-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing potential EAA protection for an antinuclear
student group).
153. See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1248-54 (3d Cir. 1993)
(determining whether the school created a limited open forum).
154. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the meaning
of "equal access"); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 859-62 (2d Cir. 1996)

(same).
155. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,247-48 (1990) (finding the application of
the EAA to religious student groups does not violate the Establishment Clause); Pope, 12 F.3d
at 1254 (rejecting the argument that enforcing the EAA would violate the Establishment
Clause); Sease, 811 F. Supp. at 193 (explaining that "it is not unconstitutional for the School
District to condition [the Gospel choir's] access to [the school] on compliance with the Equal
Access Act").
156. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 692-93 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining school from denying
the formation of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate the EAA); Colin, 83
F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (granting preliminary injunction enjoining school from denying the
formation of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate the EAA); East High
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1184 (D. Utah 1999) (finding EAA
granted GSA club the right to meet on school campus because the school allowed a
noncurriculum student club to meet during that time).
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meet would materially and substantially disrupt the school's educational
purpose, and thus it is prohibited under subsection (c)(4) of the EAA.I5 7 Other
schools have argued that the well-being exception under subsection (f) allows a
school to deny EAA access to GSA clubs that make sexually explicit material
available to students.
In order for a school to realize the value of the aforementioned curriculumrelated argument, it is imperative to recognize that EAA protection extends to
GSA clubs. It is also important to note that with this protection comes the
broad interpretation courts give the EAA, which means that Masschusetts'
proposed parental consent law will most likely be invalidated by the EAA.
Therefore, this Part first argues that the legislative history and language of the
EAA mandates that GSA clubs enjoy such protection.1 58 Then, this Part
analyzes the different arguments against extending EAA protection to GSA
clubs by focusing on several cases that address the issue.' 59 After concluding
that EAA protection extends at least to GSA clubs whose main focus is
promoting tolerance and acceptance of homosexuals,16° this Part applies the
EAA to Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law, showing that in fact the
law would be invalidated for those schools that are subject to the EAA. 16 ,
A. The EAA's PurposeIncludes Extending Free Speech Protection
to GSA Clubs
Although Congress passed the EAA primarily to extend free speech
protection to religious student groups, several commentators have argued that
this extension includes speech protection for GSA clubs. 162 The language of
157. See infra Part IH.B (detailing the Tinker argument).
158. See infra Part Ill.A (arguing that the legislative history and language of the EAA
mandates EAA protection for GSA clubs).
159. See infra Part II.B-C (focusing on the most recent cases considering whether the
EAA protection extends to GSA clubs).
160. See infra Part ll.D (concluding that EAA protection extends to GSA clubs that focus
on tolerance and acceptance).
161. See infra Part Il.E (concluding that the EAA invalidates Massachusetts' proposed
parental consent law).
162. See Regina M. Gratton, Note, It's Not Justfor Religion Anymore: Expanding the
Protectionsof the EqualAccess Act to Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual High School Students, 67
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 577, 599 (1999) (arguing that a Utah act that limited gay student clubs'
access to school premises based on the content of their speech was impermissible under the
EAA because the Utah act was a content-based discrimination); see also Broberg, supra note
129, at 116 (exploring the different arguments for and against extending EAA protection to Gay
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the Act clearly supports this conclusion. As the EAA mandates, schools cannot
discriminate against "political, philosophical, or other content" of speech, in
addition to religious speech. 63 By extending the EAA's mandate so broadly as
to include political, philosophical, and any other speech content, the EAA's
language clearly would include protection for a GSA club.
Indeed, even the EAA's legislative history offers evidence that Congress
considered such an extension. 164 Although Congress clearly passed the EAA in
order to protect religious groups, comments by several senators suggest EAA
protection for gay rights groups and other groups the senators considered to be
"fringe groups" was a necessary price to pay in order to protect religious
groups. Senator Mark Hatfield, a sponsor of the EAA, commented that
although GSA clubs may not be the favored group, including language in the
EAA that would arguably extend EAA protection to such a group was
necessary to pass an effective statute. 65 While the EAA's legislative history is
too contradictory to be convincing evidence of the legislators' intent on this
particular issue, the fact that the issue of gay rights protection under the EAA
was discussed during the debate regarding this Act shows at the very least that
Congress contemplated the possibility of such protection when it passed the
EAA.

Straight Alliance clubs, and concluding that the school's best argument under the EAA is to
show that the clubs materially and substantially interfere with the educational activities of the
school).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000).
164. See 130 CONG. REc. S 19,226 (1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (stating that
EAA language could include gay rights group). Senator Metzenbaum stated:
So if a group wanted to use the facilities for a peaceful meeting, I read this
language to say that the school board would have absolutely no authority to deny
them that right, and if some group advocating gay rights wanted to use the school, it
would appear very clear that there would be no right to deny them those facilities.
Id.
165. 130 CONG. REc. S19,225 (1984) (statement by Sen. Hatfield). After facing repeated
questions from Senator Gorton regarding what groups could seek access to school premises
under the EAA, Senator Hatfield made the following comment:
Any time you are trying to address a question of rights, you always have the
possibility of extending those rights for those who would abuse them, but that does
not deter us from addressing those rights .... You are going to have groups that
will seek to abuse the rights of the constitution. But by the same token, I would
rather take that risk than to narrow something down so much to satisfy the concern
about one group not getting in under the tent that we in effect, by the same token,
have tightened it down so that even the legitimate groups cannot get in under the
tent.
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Further evidence suggests that implementation of the EAA is not limited
to religious groups. The Widmar case-after which Congress modeled the
EAA-was specifically characterized as free speech, as opposed to a free
exercise case.' 66 Senator Hatfield clarified that, despite Congress's main
motivation of protecting religious speech, "you can equally present [EAA
protection] as purely a matter of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly." 167 In fact, when Senator Howard Metzenbaum asked whether this
bill could limit its protection to religious student groups, Senator Hatfield
answered that the bill had to extend beyond protecting religious student groups
to satisfy all constituencies involved in drafting the EAA.168
B. Courts GrantingEAA Protectionto GSA Clubs
Certainly, the language of the statute and its legislative history
demonstrate that the EAA was meant to extend protection to more than just
religious student groups. Several federal district courts have agreed and have
applied EAA protection to GSA clubs.169 In line with the statute's purpose and
the jurisprudence that applied the EAA to religious groups, these courts have
taken an expansive view of the EAA when applying it to GSA clubs. The
following two cases-Boyd County High School Gay StraightAlliance v.

166. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 n.13 (1981) (characterizing the case as a
free speech claim). The Court stated:
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and respondents'
claim to use that forum does not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free
Exercise Clause. Respondents' claim also implicates First Amendment rights of
speech and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that
we decide the case.
Id.
167. 130 CONG. REc. S19,217 (1984) (statement by Sen. Hatfield).
168. See 130 CONG. REc. S19,225 (1984) (statement by Sen. Hatfield) ("I say, to answer
the question of the Senator, no, that would not suffice. This verbiage is basically an attempt to
meet the concerns of various and sundry groups in protecting rights as well as extending rights,
and this was the most concise, the briefest way we were able to do that.").
169. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 692-93 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining a school from denying
the formation of a GSA club because such denial would most likely violate the EAA); Colin v.
Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting a GSA club a
preliminary injunction); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
1184 (D. Utah 1999) (finding EAA granted a GSA club the right to meet on school campus in
year 1997-98 because the school allowed a noncurriculum-student club to meet during that
time).
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Board of Education170 and Colin v. Orange Unified School District171exemplify how such an expansive view operates to extend EAA protection to
GSA clubs.
1. Boyd County High School Gay Straight Alliance v. Board of Education
As discussed in Part II, the EAA does not prevent school boards from
exercising discretion when maintaining order and discipline on school premises
or protecting the well-being of students. 72 Indeed, a school does not have to
extend access to a club that will materially and substantially interfere with the
educational activities within the school. 173 It is quite foreseeable that the
existence of a GSA club in high schools in certain areas of this country would
cause great controversy, leading to potentially violent behavior on the part of
students opposed to these clubs. Therefore, opponents to GSA clubs argue that
this kind of reaction justifies denying GSA clubs EAA protection, pursuant to
the authority174
retained by school officials under the Act to maintain discipline in
the schools.
Such an argument was presented and explicitly rejected by a federal
district court in Boyd. 175 In this case, a group of students formed a GSA club at
Boyd County High School in order to "provide students with a safe haven to
talk about anti-gay harassment and to work together to promote tolerance,
understanding and acceptance of one another regardless of sexual
177
orientation.', 176 However, once school officials granted access to the club,
student and parent reaction was openly hostile. 178 In reaction to student
170.
171.

Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 693. For a discussion of this case, see infra Part lII.B. 1.
Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. For a discussion of this case, see infra Part III.B.2.

172.

20 U.S.C. § 4071(f) (2000).

173. Id. § 4071(c)(4).
174. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 569 (N.D. Texas 2004)
(considering whether § 4071(c)(4) allows a school to deny EAA access to a GSA club based on
the potential controversy accompanying the club); Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 688-91 (addressing
defendant's argument that the controversy spawned by formation of a GSA club warrants
denying that club EAA access).
175. See Boyd 258 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91 (rejecting defendant's Tinker argument).
176. Id. at 670.
177. The group's application was originally denied access by the high school's governing
body-Site-Based Decision Making Council (the Council). Id. at 672. However, after
receiving a letter from the ACLU detailing the requirements of the EAA, the Council eventually
reconsidered the application and approved the club. Id. at 673.
178. Id. at 673. The court characterized the school as suffering from serious homophobic
problems, noting that students in the school had commented that "they needed to take all the
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protests and class boycotts, 179 the school board decided to prevent all student
clubs from meeting on campus, including noncurriculum and curriculum
clubs.' 80
After finding that the school had failed to prevent noncurriculum clubs
from meeting on campus,' 8 ' the district court rejected the school's claim that
the hostile reaction to the GSA club justified denying the club access.182 The
school argued that under the Tinker rule, as codified by the EAA, the school
had discretion to restrict access to the GSA club because the club's existence
"materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school." 183 In rejecting this argument, the
court noted that the Tinker rule was not meant to give school officials authority
to suppress student speech based solely on the reaction that speech generated. 184
The school's argument would allow a "heckler's veto" to justify speech
suppression, a result that is antithetical to free speech doctrine.1 85 The court
found that the EAA's incorporation of the Tinker holding "means that a
school may not deny equal access to a student group because student and
community opposition to the group substantially interferes with the school's
fucking faggots out in the back woods and kill them." Id. at 670 n. 1. Further harassment
included using a megaphone to chant "faggot-kisser" and "fag-lover" to other students during a
basketball game. Id. When school officials approved the club at a public meeting, community
reaction was embarrassing. Id. at 673. One member of the Council stated that she was
[A]ppalled at the reaction of the group, the audience. There was nothing but hatred
in that room and ignorance showed by moms and dads and grandparents. When I
left that meeting, I honestly thought that, you know, yes, a GSA is very much
needed in our community, and these people right here needed to be mandated to go
to it. It was horrible. And I literally left that meeting with a fear of what was going
to happen in our school the next few days. I believe that we can teach tolerance
and we can teach it until we are blue in the face, but if our parents don't teach it to
our children also, then it's almost like a losing battle.
Id.
179. Id. at 674.
180. Id. at 675. In response to the disruption created by opponents to the GSA club, the
school board held an emergency meeting whereby it voted to suspend all clubs, noncurricular
and curricular, for the rest of the 2002-03 school year. Id. Despite this suspension, the school
allowed several clubs to meet during noninstructional time on school premises, including a
Drama Club, Bible Club, Executive Council, and Beta Club. Id. at 676-80.
181. Id. at 688.
182. Id. at 690-91.
183. Id. at 689 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,509
(1969)).
184. Id. at 690.
185. See id. at 689 (noting that both Terminiellov. Chicago,337 U.S. 1 (1949), and Tinker
hold that a "heckler's veto" is not sufficient to deny an individual's free speech rights).
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ability to maintain order and discipline."'' 86 Rather, the real question is whether
the student group's activities have been sufficiently disruptive to meet the
Tinker test.187 The court found the GSA club members were not sufficiently
disruptive 188 and, therefore, granted the students a preliminary injunction.' 89
2. Colin v. Orange Unified School District
The facts in Colin exemplify the type of bias and discrimination GSA
clubs can face from hostile school boards. There, students from El Modena
High School in Orange, California, requested permission to form a GSA
club.190 The club was formed to help promote acceptance and tolerance
among gay and straight students.' 9' The students obtained a faculty advisor
and applied to school officials for official recognition. 192 Instead of
following their custom of leaving the approval decision to the school
administration, school officials sent the application to the school board to
see whether it would approve the GSA club. 193 The board delayed action on
the GSA application, and the delay caused the group to miss several student
194
group functions held by the school for officially recognized groups.
After holding a public forum to hear arguments both for and against the
GSA and delaying the decision several times, the board unanimously voted
to deny the students' application to form the GSA club.195 Although the
students assured the board that the focus of the club was on tolerance and not
sex education, the board chose not to believe the students and denied the club

186. Id. at 690.
187. Id.
188. Despite all of this hostility directed to the existence of the GSA group, only once was
classroom disruption caused by a GSA supporter. Id. at 691. Apparently, GSA supporters had
pressured a student to leave a particular classroom. Id. at 675.
189. Id. at 693. The GSA club eventually received a favorable settlement from the school
district whereby the district promised to let the club meet, to initiate antiharassment training for
teachers and students, and to pay for the students' legal fees. See Gay Students Win 12 Month
Legal Battle with Kentucky School, 365GAv.coM, at http://www.365gay.coni/news
con04/02/020304boydSettles.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
190. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1138-39.
194. Id. at 139.
195. Id.
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recognition on the basis that discussions regarding sexuality were age
inappropriate. 96
In granting the students a preliminary injunction, the district court
explained that the school board would not likely be able to show that the
GSA club would violate subsection (c)(4) of the EAA by materially and
substantially interfering with the school's educational activities. 197 Rather,
the court found that a group of students formed to discuss tolerance and
acceptance actually may help prevent "disruptions to education that can take
place when students are harassed based on sexual orientation. "' 98 In addition,
the court noted that issuing an injunction best serves the public interest
because it protects a student club that promotes tolerance and prevents
discrimination.1 99 After citing several statistics that suggested homosexual
teens are subjected to violent discrimination, the court stated that its
injunction not only supported a student's pursuit of ideas and tolerance of
diverse viewpoints, but also may "involve the protection of life itself. ",2°°
C. Denying EAA Protection to a GSA Club: Caudillo v. Lubbock
Independent School District
Courts taking an expansive view of the EAA interpret subsection (c)(4) as
a codification of the Tinker standard. 20 1 As discussed in Boyd, the Tinker
standard prevents a school board from restricting student speech based solely
2 2
on the reaction such speech will garner from those opposed to its message. 0
However, the GSA club speech protected20in3 both Boyd and Colin was speech
that promoted tolerance and acceptance.
After those cases, the question

196. Id. at 1139-40.
197. Id. at 1146.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1150.
200. Id. at 1151.
201. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 870 n.30 (2d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that subsection (c)(4) is a codification of the Tinker standard); Boyd County High
Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 690 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (same).
202. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (ruling that student body opposition to a GSA club
cannot solely justify denying a GSA club EAA access).
203. See id. at 669 (recognizing that the purpose of the GSA club was "to promote
tolerance, understanding and acceptance of one another regardless of sexual orientation"); Colin
v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that the
proposed GSA club's purpose was "to promote interest in a supportive community amongst our
peers").
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remained as to whether the EAA protected GSA club speech that included lewd
and sexually explicit material.
This question has been answered in the negative by at least one court. 2°4
In Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent School District,20 5 a gay rights group
wanted to post flyers, use the school's public address system, and also meet on
campus. 206 While the group's goals included promoting tolerance and
acceptance of homosexuals, the group also articulated an intent to "[e]ducate
willing youth about safe sex, AIDS, hatred, etc." 20 7 In addition, the group's
website included links to gay-topic websites that discussed in detail sexually
explicit material. 20 8 The school maintained an abstinence-only policy restricting
club discussions of sexual activity. 2°9 Because the school board viewed the gay
rights club as based on discussions of sexual activity, it denied the club access
to its facilities because the club would materially and substantially disrupt the
school's educational mission.23 0
After finding that the EAA applied, the court ruled that the school board's
actions did not violate the EAA.21 Specifically, the court agreed that the club's
speech was primarily focused on discussions of sexual activity. 212 Therefore,
the school's abstinence-only policy justified the school's decision to deny EAA
protection to the gay rights club because allowing the club to meet would
213
materially and substantially disrupt the school's educational mission.
Although the club argued that subsection (c) of the EAA codified the Tinker
ruling, the court rejected this argument and held that the EAA does not require
24
as substantial a showing of interference as that articulated in Tinker. 1
Because of the controversial nature of such a club, the court reasoned that the
204. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 571 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (holding that the EAA does not extend to a GSA club that promotes lewd and sexually
explicit material).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 556-57.
207. Id. at 556.
208. Id. at 557. This material included articles on, among other things, erection problems,
oral sex, anal warts, anal sex, and masturbation. Id.

209.

Id.

210. See id. (explaining that the school board denied the club's request after reviewing the
club's website that contained links to sexual material because such "content and material were
inappropriate for students and the... campus").
211. Id. at 570.
212. See id. at 561 (finding the information in the group's website to be lewd, indecent,
and obscene).
213. Id.at 568.
214. Id. at 569.
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school was justified in denying the club access to its facilities in order to
protect potential club members from harassment. 215 Although the club argued
that such a ruling would amount to impermissibly allowing a heckler's veto, the
when legitimate
court again reasoned that allowing such a veto was permissible
2 16
children.
age
school
regarding
issue
at
safety concerns are
The court also found that the EAA's well-being exception allowed the
school board to deny the gay rights club access to the school's facilities.21 7 The
school board argued that EAA's well-being exception allowed it to protect
children from sexually explicit material.21 8 The court agreed and ruled that the
explicit material available on the club's website in conjunction with the club's
stated goal to educate its members regarding safe sex and sexually transmitted
219
diseases justified the school's decision to prevent EAA access to the club.
a school
The court concluded by stating that "[t]his case is simply about
' 22
district's ability to control sexual subject matter on its campus. 0
D. Reconciling the District Court Split Regarding EAA Application
to a GSA Club
The Caudillo court exemplifies a more restrictive view of the EAA and
creates a potential split among the district courts. By refusing to recognize that
subsection (c)(4) acts as a codification of the Tinker standard, the Caudillo
court allows the potentially violent reaction of many to restrict the free speech
rights of few. In addition, the court employed the little used "well-being"
exception to justify restricting EAA access to a club stating that part of its
purpose for meeting was to promote tolerance. 221 By characterizing the gay
rights club as a club primarily focused on the discussion of sexually explicit
material, however, the court ignored the club's tolerant message to reach a
restrictive interpretation of the EAA.222
The Caudillo holding should be limited to its facts. That is, schools
should only be able to invoke subsection (c)(4) and the well-being exception to
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
tolerance

Id.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id.at 570.
Id.at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 571.
See id. at 556 (referring only once to the fact the group was also formed to promote
and acceptance).

1882

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1847 (2004)

prevent sexually explicit material from being discussed at a school with an
abstinence-only policy. Extending such a holding to GSA clubs whose sole
mission is to promote tolerance and acceptance of homosexuals not only
violates the EAA but is also constitutionally suspect. As supported by Boyd
and Colin, a GSA club that meets solely to promote tolerance and acceptance
without discussing in detail sexually explicit material should enjoy the same
223
EAA protection enjoyed by other noncurriculum-related student groups.
Schools should not be allowed to deny a GSA club EAA access simply because
the existence of such a group may garner violent reaction. GSA groups should
not be punished for the ignorant, hostile reaction of the community.224 To hold
otherwise would violate a bedrock principle of our free speech jurisprudence
that the popularity of the speech should not dictate whether the state may or
may not restrict it.225 In Tinker, the Supreme Court eloquently stated this
concept when it ruled in favor of students who wore armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken,
in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views
of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take the risk ... and our history says that it is

this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of
our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
226
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
And as the Boyd court noted, this First Amendment risk extends to the EAA.227
Caudillo, however, suggests that subsection (c)(4) does not codify the Tinker
standard.22 8 Instead, the Caudillo court reasons that because students do not
enjoy the same free speech rights as adults, school administrators are justified
223. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 692 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (ruling that a GSA club whose primary purpose is to promote
tolerance and acceptance should be granted EAA access); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist.,
83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that a court would likely grant EAA
access to a GSA club whose primary purpose is to promote tolerance and acceptance).
224. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (recognizing that violent opposition to a GSA club
should not justify denying that GSA club EAA access).
225. See id. at 689 (noting that both Terminiello v. Chicago,337 U.S. 1(1949), and Tinker
hold that a "heckler's veto" is not sufficient to deny an individual's free speech rights).
226. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
227. Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
228. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 569 (N.D. Tex.
2003) ("Although § 4071 (c) somewhat tracks the Tinker language, this court does not believe
that the EAA requires such a substantial showing of interference under the exceptions.").
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under subsection (c)(4) to restrict EAA access to a student club that may
provoke violent opposition from the student body. 229 This interpretation is
highly suspect for several reasons. First, as noted by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Hsu, the language of subsection (c)(4) closely tracks the language
of the Tinker holding and thus should embody the expansive constitutional
rights granted students by Tinker.230 Second, the EAA was passed at least to
maintain the constitutional rights of students, if not expand such free speech
rights.231 It cannot be interpreted to limit or restrict the constitutional rights of
its students. 2332 As noted in Boyd, a student's constitutional rights cannot be
suppressed solely out of fear that such speech will generate a violent
reaction. 233 Therefore, any suggestion by Caudillo that subsection (c)(4)
permits a school board to restrict EAA access to a student group solely because
that group might generate violent opposition is unwarranted under both the
Constitution and EAA jurisprudence.
Certainly, it is reasonable to suggest that schools need not tolerate lewd
and sexually explicit speech conducted by their students.234 This Note does not
suggest such a conclusion. Rather, this Note suggests that a GSA club whose
primary focus is to promote tolerance and acceptance of homosexuals-as was
the case in Boyd and Colin-should enjoy the same EAA protection as other
noncurriculum-related student groups. The following subpart applies the
229. See id. at 569-70 (noting that the First Amendment allows school authorities to
exercise greater control over the speech of students and finding that the school officials relied
on their experience to make a judgment call as to the safety of the students).
230. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 870 n.30 (2d Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that because the language of subsection (c)(4) closely tracks the Tinker standard,
subsection (c)(4) acts as a codification of that standard).
231. See 130 CONG. REc. S19,225 (1984) (statement by Sen. Hatfield) (noting that the
EAA was meant to expand student free speech rights). Senator Hatfield stated:
I say, to answer the question of the Senator, no, that would not suffice. This
verbiage is basically an attempt to meet the concerns of various and sundry groups
in protecting rights as well as extending rights, and this was the most concise, the
briefest way we were able to do that.
Id.; Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 259 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It must be
apparent to all that the Act has made a matter once left to the discretion of local school officials
the subject of comprehensive regulation by federal law.").
232. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(recognizing that Congress cannot limit the constitutional free speech rights of students).
233. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667, 689 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (recognizing that a "heckler's veto" was insufficient to deny an
individual's free speech rights).
234. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (holding that a school can
restrict a student's speech if it contains obscene or sexually explicit material).
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EAA to Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law with such a GSA club in
mind.
E. Applying the EAA to Massachusetts' Proposed ParentalConsent Law
As suggested by Boyd and Colin, EAA protection extends to GSA clubs
that promote tolerance and acceptance of homosexuals. The language and
legislative history warrants such a conclusion, and the previous Part detailed
how the restrictions codified in the EAA do not prevent the EAA from
protecting such GSA clubs. As evinced by Boyd, the EAA prevents schools
with a limited open forum from categorically denying noncurriculum-related
GSA clubs access to that forum. 235 However, equal access means more than
that. It also means a school must treat a GSA club in the same manner as it
treats other clubs that fit within the EAA limited open forum.236 To illustrate
that point, this subpart applies the EAA to Massachusetts' proposed parental
consent law and shows how such a law is invalidated under the EAA. It is
important to note that the following analysis assumes the GSA club is
noncurriculum-related. As Part V discusses, this statute can be saved if a
school is willing to make a GSA club curriculum-related.
1. Massachusetts' ProposedParentalConsent Law
Massachusetts is considering passing a "parental notification and consent"
law that would require parental consent for any student who wants to form or
join a GSA club.237 The law has two specific mandates. First, it requires
235. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 688 (noting that absent a showing of material and
substantial interference, a school that has created a limited open forum must grant GSA clubs
access to that forum).
236. See supra Part II.C (detailing the definition of "equal access").
237. An Act Relative to Parental Notification and Consent, H. (proposed 2003), available
at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/htO1445.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). The
proposed law, in its entirety, is as follows:
Every city, town, regional school district or vocational school district implementing
or maintaining curriculum or portion thereof, or school sanctioned program or
activity, which primarily involves human sexual education, human sexuality issues,
or sexual orientation issues shall adopt a written policy ensuring parental/guardian
notification.
All such curriculum, programs, and activities shall be offered only in clearly
identified non-mandatory elective courses in which parents or guardians may
choose to enroll their children through written notification to the school, in a
manner reasonably similar to other elective courses offered by the school district.
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school districts to adopt a written policy ensuring parental or guardian
notification of any school sanctioned program or activity, "which primarily
involves human sexual education, human sexuality issues, or sexual orientation
issues., 238 The second mandate says that "[a]ll such curriculum, programs, and
activities shall be offered only in clearly identified non-mandatory elective
courses in which parents or guardians may choose to enroll their children
through written notification to the school., 239 As stated by several
Massachusetts state legislators, this bill is meant to place a parental consent
restriction on any students wishing to join or form a GSA club.24
2. Massachusetts' ProposedParentalNotification Law as Applied to
Noncurriculum-RelatedGSA Clubs Is Invalid Underthe EAA
By incorporating not only clubs that focus on sex education but also clubs
that focus on "sexual orientation issues," the proposed law does not distinguish
between Caudillo-like clubs or Boyd/Colin-like clubs. Therefore, if passed,
this law would permit a school to place a parental consent restriction on a GSA
club whose sole mission was to promote tolerance and acceptance of
homosexuals. Such an access restriction is based on the content of the GSA
To the extent practicable, instruction materials and related items for said
curriculum, programs, and activities shall be made reasonably accessible to parents,
guardians, educators, school administrators, and others for inspection and preview.
No public school teacher or administrator shall be required to participate in any
such curriculum programs, or activities that violate his or her religion's belief.
Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. By only allowing schools to offer activities primarily involving sexual orientation
to be offered as nonmandatory elective courses, this language might suggest that the bill in fact
restricts even the existence of extracurricular GSA clubs in that such clubs by virtue of being
extracurricular are not considered "courses" under the language of the statute. Massachusetts
state legislators, however, do not intend for this language to be interpreted to restrict wholly
GSA club existence. Rather, the bill is meant to require parental permission for any student
joining the extracurricular GSA club. Michael J. Meade, Mass Law Would Require Parental
Approval for Gay Straight Clubs, at http://www.gaywired.com/article.cfm?Section=9&
ID=1095 (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A
political interest group advocating for passage of the bill offers the same interpretation,
suggesting that the proposed bill improves upon Massachusetts' current parental notification
law by requiring parental consent for not only sex education classes, but also for membership
into the "insidious 'gay straight alliance' clubs." Parents' Rights Coalition, Fight for the
StrengthenedMassachusettsParentsRights Bill! Action Needed Now!, at http://www.parents
rightscoalition.org/NewPRbill.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
240. See Meade, supra note 239 (describing the drafters' intent).
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club's speech, thus acting as an impermissible "content-based" discrimination
under Section 4071 (a) of the EAA.24 1 While the proposed law does not purport
to categorically deny GSA clubs access to school facilities, it does place a
hurdle to that access based on the clubs' potential discussion regarding sexual
orientation. This policy would give schools in Massachusetts the right to
require parental consent for a noncurriculum-related GSA club while not
having the same requirement for other noncurriculum-related clubs. Such a
result would certainly violate the meaning of "equal access" under the EAA,
which current case law interprets as meaning that schools must allow
noncurriculum-related student groups to meet under the same terms and
conditions as other noncurriculum-related student groups.2 42 If such groups
are to be treated differently, the different treatment must be in favor of the
student club's free speech rights, not against such rights. 243 Furthermore,
because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gamett v. Renton244 found that
241. See 20 U.S.C. § 407 1(a) (2000) (making it unlawful for any school receiving federal
assistance and maintaining a limited open forum to deny equal access to student groups based
on the content of that group's speech).
242. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting equal access
to mean that a school must treat noncurriculum-related student groups equally).
243. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 862 (2d Cir. 1996)
(interpreting the meaning of "equal access" broadly to protect student free speech rights).
244. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 987 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit held
that the EAA's broad legislative purpose incorporates a federal free speech right to religious
student groups that cannot be abridged by state law. Id. at 646. In Garnett,several students at
Lindbergh High School in Renton, Washington, sought school approval to form a religious
student club. Id. at 643. The school district denied the students' request, citing that such
meetings would violate both the state and federal constitutions. Id. The students brought suit
alleging that the EAA allowed them to meet at school on the same basis as other noncurriculumrelated clubs. Id. The Ninth Circuit originally affirmed the district court's denial of the
student's claim, finding that the EAA violated the Establishment Clause. Id. However, the
Supreme Court vacated this decision in light of its Mergens decision, and the case was sent back
to the district court. Id.
The district court again denied the student's claim, finding that subsections (d)(5) and (d)(7)
of the EAA limited the Act from preempting state law. Id. at 644. Because the Washington state
constitution prohibited student religious meetings on school grounds, the district court found for
the school. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that these subsections did not preclude the
EAA from preempting state law. Id. at 646. The court found that subsections (d)(5) and (d)(7)
were rules of construction, not exceptions, and therefore they "instruct the court how to interpret
the Act's central command that schools not discriminate against religious speech." Id. at 644-45.
The Ninth Circuit interpreted subsections (d)(5) and (d)(7) as explicitly excluding from protection
"the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection:
'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement."' Id. at 645 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). However, the court held that these subsections do not allow for state
laws to prohibit religious student groups from meeting on school grounds because to hold
otherwise would make it too easy for schools and states to evade the EAA. Id. Because the
Supreme Court in Mergens found that the EAA evinced a broad legislative purpose,
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the EAA preempts state law, the fact that parental consent restriction comes
from state law as opposed to school policy does not save the restriction.245
Therefore, Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law is invalidated for
schools that fall within the purview of the EAA.
Although a Massachusetts school may argue that the EAA's well-being
exception allows such a restriction, no case law supports this position. Again,
Caudilloembodies a situation where a GSA club exposed students to sexually
lewd and explicit materials. 246 It would be a bit disingenuous to suggest that
the EAA's little-used well-being exception would support a content-based
restriction on a GSA club whose primary focus would be promoting tolerance
and acceptance. Rather, as suggested in Colin, allowing such a group full EAA
access would actually help support the well-being of students because it would
help teach the student body tolerance and acceptance of others.247
F. Summary
The language and legislative history of the EAA justify extending free
speech protection to GSA clubs. A community's potentially hostile reaction
will not justify preventing GSA clubs access to a school's facilities. The Tinker
standard codified in the EAA is meant to apply to the actions of the club itself,
not its opponents.248 Therefore, unless members of a GSA club act in such a
way that they materially and substantially disrupt the educational purpose of a
school, schools cannot invoke the Tinker rule as a justification for denying
GSA clubs EAA protection. Although the Caudillo court suggests that the
EAA does not protect lewd and sexually explicit speech, the same is not
true for clubs whose main focus is promoting tolerance and acceptance for

the Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended to preempt state law. Id.
Despite the Ninth Circuit's holding, some might argue that there still exists a question
whether state law that affects nonreligious student groups can be preempted. However, given
that the statute extends protection not only to religious groups, but also to clubs engaged in
political and philosophical speech, such arguments would seem meritless.
245. See id. (finding that the EAA preempts state law).
246. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 561 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (noting that the GSA club at issue engaged in sexually lewd and explicit speech).
247. See Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(noting that protecting a GSA club would serve public policy).
248. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Allliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d
667,689 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (emphasizing that Tinker restrictions must be justified by the actions
of the speaker, not by the speaker's opponents).
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homosexuals. These clubs pose no threat to the well-being of a school's
students, and thus, these clubs should enjoy EAA protection.
This protection extends so far that it invalidates Massachusetts' proposed
parental consent law. Because the law attempts to single out GSA clubs based
on the content of their speech, the law acts as an impermissible content-based
restriction. Although the law does not intend to deny categorically access to a
GSA student group, following the law would mean a school would have to treat
a GSA club differently from other noncurriculum-related student groups. The
EAA prevents schools from engaging in such unequal treatment because to do
so violates the broad interpretation of "equal access."
This analysis assumes that the GSA club in question was noncurriculumrelated and that its sole purpose was promoting tolerance and acceptance. As
noncurriculum-related clubs, such clubs are by definition entitled to the
school's limited open forum. However, if a Massachusetts school could make
the GSA club curriculum-related, it could argue that the GSA club is not a
noncurriculum-related student group and therefore not entitled to access to the
school's limited open forum. As a result, the EAA would not invalidate
Massachusetts' proposed parental consent restriction. How a Massachusetts
school can achieve this result is discussed in more detail in Part V.
However, because the concept of making a GSA club curriculum-related is
new, the district courts have misinterpreted the EAA when handling such an
argument. In dictum, they have suggested that even if a school can make a
GSA club curriculum-related, the club is still entitled to access to the school's
limited open forum. 249 Therefore, to salvage Massachusetts' proposed parental
consent law, Part IV must first show how these courts have misinterpreted the
EAA.25°
IV. Curriculum-RelatedClubs Do Not Get EAA Protection
Whether schools with EAA limited open forums must grant EAA
protection to curriculum-related clubs is a new issue raised by GSA club
litigation. The secular nature of GSA clubs makes them unique from the
religious clubs that have previously been at the center of EAA litigation.
Schools cannot choose to make a religious club curriculum-related in order
249. See id. at 684 (suggesting that once a limited open forum is created, curriculumrelated clubs must receive the same treatment as noncurriculum-related clubs); Colin, 83 F.
Supp. 2d at 1146 (same).
250. See infra Part IV (arguing that curriculum-related clubs do not receive EAA access,
even if a school creates a limited open forum).
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to work around the EAA because to do so would most likely involve
sponsoring the club in some manner, thus raising Establishment Clause
concerns. 25 1 This is further supported by the fact the Mergens curriculumrelated test assumes that religious clubs are likely noncurriculum-related. In
formulating the curriculum-related test, the Mergens Court reasoned that
[b]ecause the purpose of granting equal access is to prohibit
discrimination between religious or political clubs on the one hand and
other noncurriculum-related student groups on the other, the Act is
club is itself likely to
premised on the notion that a religious or political
252
be a noncurriculum-related student group.
In contrast, there is no Establishment Clause barrier for schools that
want to make a GSA club curriculum-related, and as a result, schools
defending EAA claims coming from GSA clubs have asserted that the GSA
club is curriculum-related and therefore not subject to EAA protection. 3 In
handling these arguments, both the Boyd court and the Colin court suggested
in dictum that once a school creates an EAA limited open forum, it must
grant even curriculum-related clubs equal access to that forum. 25 4 This Part
argues that the district courts have misinterpreted the EAA. The EAA's
language suggests that the Act's protection extends only to student groups
found in the school's limited open forum, which by definition includes only
noncurriculum-related clubs, not curriculum-related clubs. Therefore,
schools can validly place content-based restrictions on such speech.

251. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (setting forth "the three main
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity'") (quoting Walz

v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
252. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 238 (1990).
253. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (discussing the applicability of the EAA to GSA
groups); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1143-46 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(addressing defendant's argument that a GSA group is curriculum-related and therefore cannot
avail itself of EAA protection).
254. See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 684 ("Thus, once a court determines that a limited open
forum has been created because school access has been provided to at least on noncurriculumrelated group, the access afforded must be equal to that provided to all groups curricular and
noncurricular."); Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 ("So long as the Board has a limited open forum
at El Modena and allows any 'non-curriculum related' student groups to meet, it cannot prohibit
the Gay-Straight Alliance even if its meetings directly relate to the curriculum.").
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A. DistrictCourts Misinterpretthe EAA
1. Colin v. Orange Unified School District Revisited
In considering the school's curriculum-related argument, the Colin court
in dictum contended that even if the GSA club was curriculum-related, the
255
EAA prevents the school board from withholding recognition of the group.
According to the court, the only meetings schools could prohibit under the
EAA were meetings that did not meet the Tinker standard as codified in Section
4071 (c)(4). 6 That is, unless a GSA club had materially and substantially
disrupted the school's educational purpose, then the EAA prevented schools
from denying GSA clubs access to a school's EAA limited open forum.
Because a club whose focus is tolerance and acceptance will almost always pass
the Tinker standard, the EAA prevents schools from denying curriculum-related
GSA clubs equal access. 257 Therefore, "[s]o long as the Board has a 'limited
open forum' ... and allows any 'noncurriculum related' student groups to
meet, it can not prohibit the Gay-Straight Alliance even if its meetings directly
258
relate to the curriculum.
The Colin court's interpretation is premised on the erroneous assertion that
the EAA offers the Tinker standard as the only possible restriction a school is
permitted to place on clubs otherwise qualified to meet. 259 However, as
discussed in Part II, the EAA offers schools authority to limit the structure of
student group meetings in several ways, including the authority to require
student meetings to be voluntary and student-initiated, 260 the authority to
restrict nonschool personnel access to the meetings, 261 and the authority to
prevent application of the EAA from abridging any person's constitutional
rights.2 62 Certainly, the Tinker standard and well-being exception is a popular
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1146 (suggesting that the EAA allows schools to prohibit only meetings that
"materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within
the school") (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (2000)).
257. Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
258. Id.
259. See id. (suggesting subsection (c)(4), which codified the Tinker standard, is the only
restriction school boards can permissibly place on student speech under the EAA).
260. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1) (2000).
261. Id. § 4071(c)(5).
262. Id. § 4071(d)(7). Although outside the scope of this Note, this provision could be
implicated by the proposed parental consent law discussed in Part IH because that law attempts
to strengthen a parent's constitutional right to rear their children. See supraPart 11I (discussing
the Massachusetts proposed parental consent law).
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defense argued by school boards refusing to grant GSA clubs EAA
protection. 263 However, this popularity is not rooted in the fact that it is the
only defense available under the EAA, but rather because GSA clubs are so
controversial. Asserting that the Tinker standard is the only identifiable
limitation on EAA protection for schools subject to the Act-as asserted by the
Colin court-is simply a false premise.
2. Boyd County High School Gay Straight Alliance v. Board of Education
The Boyd court offered a similar interpretation when it briefly considered
another section of the EAA, Section 4072(3)'s definition of "meeting." 264 The
court interpreted Section 4072(3)'s definition of meeting so broadly as to
include EAA protection for all activities in which students are permitted to
engage in a particular school.265 The court suggested that Section 4072(3)
defined meeting "to include all activities in which student groups are permitted
to engage in a particular school. '"266 This statement was not a direct quote of
Section 4072(3) but rather the Boyd court's interpretation of that section's
language.267 From this interpretation, the Boyd court concluded that "once a
court determines that a limited open forum has been created... the access
be equal to that provided to all groups, both curricular and
afforded must 268
noncurricular.
On the other hand, a closer reading of Section 4072(3) shows the
definition of meeting does not warrant the Boyd court's broad interpretation.
Under Section 4072(3), meeting "includes those activities of student groups
which are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly
263. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 571 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (finding that a school properly invoked the EAA's well-being exception when denying a
GSA club EAA access); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd.of Educ., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 688-91 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (considering defendant's argument that the GSA club
materially and substantially interferes with the educational opportunities at the school); Colin v.
Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that the
GSA club was not materially and substantially interfering with educational opportunities of the
school).
264. Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 683-84 (noting the broad definition of "to meet" under the

EAA).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See 20 U.S.C. § 4072(3) (2000) (defining meeting as including "those activities of
student groups which are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly
related to the school curriculum").
268. Boyd, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
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related to the school curriculum. ' 269 Clearly, the Boyd court's definition of
meeting is much broader than that in the statute. By limiting the definition of
"meeting" to activities permitted under the limited open forum and not directly
related to the school curriculum, the EAA's language suggests a conclusion
contrary to the one reached by the Boyd court. That is, the EAA's scope is
limited to the student groups that fall within the school's limited open forum,
which by definition only include noncurriculum-related student clubs, not
curriculum-related student clubs.
B. EAA 's Language Does Not Grant Protectionto CurriculumRelated Clubs
Granting EAA protection to curriculum-related clubs is also not warranted
under other sections within the EAA. Under Section 4071(a), schools with
limited open forums are prevented from denying equal access to "any students
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of
the.., content of the speech at such meetings." 270 A limited open forum is
defined by the existence of a noncurriculum-related student club meeting at
school.27 ' Combine this definition with Section 4072(3)'s definition of
meeting, which excludes meetings directly related to school curriculum, and it
becomes clear from the language of the EAA that EAA protection is intended
to extend only to clubs within the limited open forum. Because the Act does
not consider curriculum-related clubs as part of a school's limited open forum,
EAA protection does not extend to curriculum-related clubs even if a school
does maintain a limited open forum.
C. District Courts' InterpretationMisconceives the Concept
of Limited Open Forum
It is easy to understand why these district courts misinterpreted the EAA.
Because religious student groups did not make this curriculum-related
argument, these GSA cases are the first cases where the Mergens curriculumrelated test is applied to the plaintiff student club. Typically in religious
student group cases, the courts apply the Mergens curriculum-related test to the
other student groups currently meeting at the school to determine whether
269.

20 U.S.C. § 4072(3) (2000).

270.
271.

Id. § 4071(a) (emphasis added).
Id. § 4071(b).

SCHOOLS TRYING TO A VOID EQUAL ACCESS ACT

1893

the school maintained a limited open forum.272 If the court found a
noncurriculum-related student group, then the school was deemed to have an
EAA limited open forum, and it was assumed that the religious club would fit
within that limited open forum. As discussed, this assumption stems from the
fact the Mergens curriculum-related test was premised on the notion that a
religious student group is by its nature noncurriculum-related.27 3 Therefore,
if a school had a limited open forum, then the plaintiff religious group was
entitled to equal access to that limited open forum by virtue of the club being
a noncurriculum-related student group.
However, by suggesting that a plaintiff GSA club that is curriculumrelated receives equal access to a school's EAA limited open forum, the
district courts misconceive the concept of limited open forum. The EAA
limited open forum is modeled after the constitutional concept of limited
public or open forum. 274 In the constitutional context, a limited public forum
is created when a school opens its property to the public for a limited class of
speakers, on limited topics, or for a limited amount of time, or both.275
Because the forum is limited, a school can confine access to that forum based
276
on the "limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.
However, those groups and speakers that fit within that limitation must be
granted equal access. "Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the
State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. , 277 In Widmar, for
example, the university could not restrict a religious student group's access to
its campus
because the school opened its property to use by other student
8
groups.

27

272. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 245-46 (1990) (applying the curriculumrelated test to a school's pre-existing student groups); Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12
F.3d 1244, 1248 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying the Mergens curriculum-related test to the schoolapproved Key Club).
273. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (noting that the Mergens Court formulated
the noncurriculum-related test based on the notion that religious student groups are
noncurriculum-related).
274. See Laycock, supra note 53, at 36 ("[EAA limited open forum] resembles the
constitutional concept of 'limited public forum,' but it goes well beyond the Supreme Court's
cases.").
275. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 815, 829 (1995)
(explaining that a limited public forum is created when a forum is open for only limited
purposes such as for certain topics or certain groups).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
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Like the constitutional limited public forum, an EAA limited open
forum is defined by the limited purpose upon which the forum is dedicated.
However, whereas the contours of a school's constitutional limited public
forum are determined by what a particular school has intended through
practice and policy, the EAA limited open forum is determined by a federal
court's application of the Mergens curriculum-related test to the school's
extracurricular clubs. 279 That is, if a federal court applying Mergens'
curriculum-related test to a school finds that the school allowed a
noncurriculum-related club to meet, then the school is deemed to have an
EAA limited open forum regardless of whether the school intended to create
such a forum. 280 Nevertheless, for both a constitutional limited public forum
and an EAA limited open forum, a school does not have to grant equal access
to those student groups that do not fit within the forum. In the case of the
EAA, a curriculum-related student group is not part of an EAA limited open
forum because the EAA intends to include only noncurriculum-related clubs
in that forum. Therefore, if a school is willing to make a GSA club
curriculum-related, then that school can escape the clutches of the EAA.
D. Summary
Curriculum-related student groups do not enjoy EAA protection. To
adopt the interpretation asserted by the Colin and Boyd courts would
undermine the concept of "limited" in limited open forum. Instead, the EAA
is meant to protect only noncurriculum-related student groups, and therefore,
schools willing to make a GSA club curriculum-related may circumvent the
EAA. This opportunity proves valuable to schools that may be amicable to
the formation of a GSA club but want to exert more control over the club
than the EAA offers. To circumvent the EAA, however, a school still has to
pay a price. To make a GSA club curriculum-related, a school has to link the
subject matter of its curriculum to the subject matter of the GSA club. The
next Part explores how close of a relationship is necessary by considering
what a Massachusetts school would have to do to save Massachusetts'
proposed parental consent law.

279. See Laycock, supra note 53, at 36 (noting the differences between a constitutional
limited public forum and an EAA limited open forum).
280. See id. ("Most notably, government speech does not create a constitutional public
forum, but a school-sponsored student group that is not curriculum-related (if there is such a
thing) creates a statutory open forum.").
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V. Salvaging Massachusetts' ProposedParentalConsent Law by Making
a GSA Club Curriculum-Related
As was pointed out in Part II, usually any court hearing an EAA challenge
must conduct an analysis determining whether the defendant school had created an
EAA limited open forum. 281 In doing so, courts will determine whether the school
has allowed a noncurriculum-related student club to meet on campus by applying
the Mergens four-prong curriculum-related test.282 For a student club to be
considered curriculum-related under this test, the student group must fit within one
of the following categories: the subject matter of the group is actually taught by a
regularly offered course, the subject matter of the group concerns the school's
curriculum as a whole, participation in the group is required for a particular class, or
group participation results in academic credit.283 This Part applies this test to a GSA
club to show how a school intending to salvage Massachusetts' proposed parental
consent law can do so by-making a GSA club curriculum-related.

A. Applying the Mergens Curriculum-RelatedTest to a GSA Club
A Massachusetts school attempting to salvage the state's proposed parental
consent law will find the first category of the Mergenscurriculum-related test most
useful in making a GSA club curriculum-related. A GSA club likely will not fit
within the second category because that category relates to groups concerned
with the body of courses as a whole, which the Mergens court points out
translates to a student government. 284 To say that a GSA club relates to the
whole school's curriculum is indeed a stretch. The third option will not be
applicable because a Massachusetts school is attempting to place a parental
consent restriction on the GSA club, so it is inapposite to suggest that
participation in the GSA club is required by a course if parental consent is also
needed to participate in the club.285 It might be possible to make the club

281. See infra Part II.B (discussing the EAA limited open forum).
282. See infra Part II.B (noting how the Mergens curriculum-related test operates).
283. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239-40 (1990).
284. See id. at 240 (noting that a student government satisfies prong two of the curriculumrelated test); see also East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d. 1166,

1183 (D. Utah 1999) (finding that a National Honors Society satisfies prong two of the
curriculum-related test).
285. See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1252 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that, under Mergens, required student membership is sufficient to make a group curriculumrelated).
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curriculum-related by awarding course credit for participation, but a school
might be hesitant to do so because of the controversial nature of such a club.
Indeed, a Massachusetts school's best choice for making a GSA club
curriculum-related is to make the subject matter of the club a part of the
curriculum. Given that a GSA club focused on promoting tolerance and
acceptance may be characterized as political, a school's political science or
history class may be a candidate for making the subject matter of the GSA club
curriculum-related.28 6 Furthermore, although the GSA club may not discuss
anything sexually explicit regarding homosexuality, a sex education class may
also serve as a candidate because both a sex education class and a GSA club's
mission can encapsulate sexual orientation issues. 287 But how much of the
GSA club's subject matter must be a part of the school's curriculum before the
club is deemed curriculum-related?
The EAA's broad legislative purpose dictates a narrow reading of the
Mergens curriculum-related test so that a school cannot simply circumvent the
EAA by calling a club curriculum-related.288 Courts will focus on the school's
practice and will require a close nexus between the GSA club and the school's
curriculum before that GSA club is considered curriculum-related. 289 Of
course, figuring out what degree of relatedness is required to satisfy a federal
judge is difficult to determine. The Pope court's analysis discussed in Part H
offers some guidance and suggests that curriculum-relatedness can be
determined by looking at the primary focus of the student activity compared to
the significant topics discussed in the class assertedly related to the group.2 °
Professor Mawdsley's interpretation also proves helpful as he suggests the
classes need to have an interactive component such that the "inputs of
291
knowledge and skills [flow] between the courses and student groups.
Clearly, these interpretations suggest that at the least the mere coexistence
of a political science class or sex education class and a GSA club will not

286. See Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(addressing the school's argument that the GSA club was curriculum-related in that it
overlapped with the school's sex education class).
287. Id.
288. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246 (noting that the curriculum-related test is applied to a
school's practice rather than merely its policy).
289. Id.
290. See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1253 (3d Cir. 1993) ( "The
curriculum-relatedness of a student activity must be determined by reference to the primary
focus of the activity measured against the significant topics taught in the course that assertedly
relates to the group.").
291. Mawdsley, supra note 89, at 25.
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satisfy Mergens' curriculum-related test. 292 Such a connection is too tenuous to
satisfy the Mergens test.293 Furthermore, just because sexual orientation is a
subject included in the teacher's edition of a class textbook will not satisfy the
Mergens test if that teacher does not teach that section to the class. 294 Again,
courts will look at the actual practice of the school. Furthermore, given that the
Pope court's analysis suggests the club's subject matter needs to be a
significant topic discussed in class, a few isolated discussions in a sex
education class
or political science class about homosexuality will not meet the
295
Mergens test.

Given the narrow application of the Mergens curriculum-related test, a
school interested in making a GSA club curriculum-related likely will have to
adopt the GSA club's message. If the Colin and Boyd cases are any indication,
a GSA club in Massachusetts likely will have tolerance and acceptance of
homosexuality as their mission. 296 Therefore, this means a school intent on
292. See Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1144-45 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (rejecting school's argument that the GSA club was related to school's sex education
curriculum simply because the club dealt with sexual issues).
293. Id. at 1145 (explaining that curriculum-related groups must directly relate to the
subject matter of courses). This argument was considered in detail by the Colin court. Id.
There, the school tried to argue that the GSA club was curriculum-related, and, thus, was not
entitled to EAA protection. Id. In determining whether the subject matter of the GSA club was
actually taught in the school sex education class, the court noted that the school had
mischaracterized the stated mission of the club. Id. at 1143. According to the court, the school
board failed to recognize that the student's proposed mission statement stated that the purpose
of the club was to promote tolerance and acceptance, not sexuality. Id. In contrast, the school's
sex education class had no discussion of tolerance and acceptance of homosexuality. Id.
Although the school board noted that the health book included a section on homophobia, the
court stated there was no evidence that section was ever taught in class. Id. Therefore, the court
concluded that "as a matter of fact ... the subject matter of the proposed Gay-Straight Alliance
was not covered in the curriculum at El Modena High School." Id. at 1144.
294. Id. at 1144.
295. Id. at 1145 ("[E]ven if there were some small nexus between what is taught in some
classes on what the group proposes to discuss, it would require considerably more for the GayStraight Alliance to be considered curriculum related under Mergens.").
296. Id. at 1141. The mission statement in full read as follows:
Our goal in this organization is to raise public awareness and promote tolerance by
providing a safe forum for discussion of issues related to sexual orientation and
homophobia. We wish to stress the need for people to put aside their personal
prejudice and agree to treat everyone with respect when the situation calls for it.
We invite ALL students, gay or straight, to join us in discussions.. .that will
counterattack unfair treatment and prejudice. We respect privacy and require NO
one to make disclosures regarding his or her own sexual orientation....This is not a
sexual issue, it is about gaining support and promoting tolerance and respect for all
students.
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making a GSA club curriculum-related most likely will have to adopt a gaypositive message into its curriculum. The federal courts' narrow application of
Mergens' curriculum-related test requires a close nexus between the class and
the club. Given this narrow reading, a school attempting to evade the EAA
should adopt the message of the GSA club and teach tolerance and acceptance
of homosexuality. To deviate from the subject matter of the GSA club any
more leaves a school open to a federal judge's interpretation of the Mergens
test.
Schools, however, would not have to discuss the practice of homosexuality
in graphic detail. As was true in Colin, GSA clubs likely will not consider sex
as the main component of the GSA club.297 And, as was held in Caudillo, for
those clubs that do primarily focus on sexually explicit material, the school
could justifiably deny such a group EAA protection based on the EAA's wellbeing exception. 298 Therefore, for those schools that are being petitioned by a
GSA club whose primary focus is tolerance and acceptance, they will not have
to discuss the practice of homosexual sex in their curriculum to make the club
GSA related.
By teaching tolerance and acceptance, the school will be able to argue that
the GSA club is curriculum-related, thereby evading EAA protection. The
value of doing this in the Massachusetts context is clear-it allows
Massachusetts schools to require parental permission before a student could
join or form a GSA club. The EAA would invalidate such a requirement if the
school had a limited open forum and the GSA club was noncurriculum-related.
By making the GSA club curriculum-related, a Massachusetts school that has a
limited open forum would not have to close that forum and still will be able to
require parental permission for the GSA club without violating the EAA.
Furthermore, as is being attempted by Massachusetts' proposed law, the school
also could require parental
permission for the class that includes the gay299
curriculum.
positive

297. Id.
298. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 571 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
299. See An Act Relative to Parental Notification and Consent, H. 1445 (proposed 2003)
("To the extent practicable, instruction materials and related items for said curriculum,
programs, and activities shall be made reasonably accessible to parents, guardians, educators,
school administrators, and others for inspection and review."), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht01445.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
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B. The Policy Ramifications of Salvaging Massachusetts' Proposed
ParentalConsent Law
Choosing to salvage Massachusetts' proposed parental consent law forces
schools to adopt a substantive part of the GSA clubs' subject matter and
therefore still comes at a significant price. To make the GSA club curriculumrelated, a Massachusetts school will most likely have to teach tolerance and
acceptance of homosexuality in either a sex education class or political science
class. This may sound self-defeating in that the school that wants to control
access to a GSA club would most likely abhor talking about homosexuality in a
sex education class. If the concern of the school is whether a parent approves
of the GSA club's discussion of homosexuality, certainly the same concerns
would hold true and become even more manifest if the school is adopting the
GSA club's message into its curriculum. 3°° However, Massachusetts schools
can mitigate this problem to a degree by also requiring parental permission for
the sex education class or political science class.30 1 By placing a parental
consent requirement on both the class and the GSA club, a school successfully
serves the parental interest of monitoring the student's exposure to
homosexuality.
This may act as the best choice for both opponents and proponents of gay
rights. Opponents are best served in that students will not join a GSA club
without parental permission, and therefore, students will not be able to join
302
these clubs behind the back of the parents. Proponents are also served in that
a school will have to incorporate a gay rights discussion into the school's
curriculum. As such, students who might not otherwise join a GSA club might
become exposed to sexual orientation discussions. More importantly, the
school will be sponsoring a discussion regarding gay rights, which adds more
credence to the issue than if such speech is relegated to mere student
endorsement in a noncurriculum-related GSA club. Although the speech still
would be restricted by parental consent, at least it would send the message that
the school is willing to offer such discussions as part of its curriculum. 30 3 In
300. See Parents Right Coalition, at http://www.parentsrightscoalition.org/HorrorStories.
htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (evincing a distaste for any exposure that students may receive
to homosexuality) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
301. See An Act Relative to Parental Notification and Consent, H. 1445 (proposed 2003)
(proposing a parental consent restriction on both sex education and also GSA clubs), available
at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/ht01445.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
302. Parents Right Coalition, at http://www.parentsrightscoalition.org/NewPRbill.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004) (noting a concern for students joining GSA clubs without telling parents)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
303. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1987) (alluding to the
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that respect, an implicit message of acceptance would be communicated to a
larger segment of the school community.
On the other hand, this option might warrant the exact opposite reaction
from both proponents and opponents of GSA clubs. Opponents of GSA clubs
would disagree with incorporating a gay rights discussion into the curriculum
because it would take on the imprimatur of the school. A school that allows a
GSA club to meet unfettered is not adopting that club's message or subject
matter. However, incorporating such discussion into a school's curriculum
would force a parent opposed to homosexuality to decide whether that parent is
opposed enough to keep his child from sitting in on that political science or sex
education course. Knowing that the school is implicitly tolerating gay rights
discussion by incorporating such talk into the curriculum might inflame
opponents of gay rights. Proponents of GSA clubs might be disturbed by the
fact GSA clubs cannot meet unfettered and would find little solace that the
school adopted a pro-gay stance in a class also subject to parental consent.
These are all difficult issues that a Massachusetts school must consider when
assessing the political and social dynamic of the school district's respective
community.
VI. Conclusion
Schools face a tough decision when GSA clubs petition for recognition. If
a school offers an EAA limited open forum, that decision becomes even
tougher. The EAA forces such schools to grant a noncurriculum-related GSA
club access to its facilities. Parents and the surrounding community may not
like the idea that students can join these GSA clubs after school without
parental consent. Massachusetts is trying to accommodate this concern by
requiring parental consent for any student wanting to join or form a GSA club.
Unfortunately for Massachusetts, the EAA's expansive application not only
allows GSA groups promoting tolerance and acceptance to meet on campus,
but it also invalidates such a law as it applies to schools with EAA limited open
forums because the proposed law singles out GSA clubs with an impermissible
content-based restriction.
On the other hand, the EAA protection does not extend to curriculumrelated student groups. By adopting the subject matter covered in a GSA club
into a school's curriculum, a Massachusetts school could avoid the EAA and
thereby preserve Massachusetts' parental consent restriction. A Massachusetts

legitimizing effect schools have on speech they sponsor, as opposed to merely accommodate).
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school can salvage the state's proposed parental consent law without having to
forgo federal funding or close the school's limited open forum. Although
transforming a GSA club into a curriculum-related student group warrants the
school's acceptance of the group's gay-positive message, it just may be the best
option the school has in avoiding the purview of the EAA while still serving its
community's interests.

